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Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why 
It Matters* 
Judith M. Stinson† 
I cannot tell you how many times I have read briefs asserting an 
improbable proposition of law and citing a case as authority. The 
proposition sounds so dubious that I immediately look it up to see if 
the cited court can really have made this ruling. So often I find the 
proposition is indeed there, but was uttered in dictum—where the 
court paid no price, and consequently paid little attention.
1 
INTRODUCTION 
For close to a century, members of the legal profession 
have debated the distinction between holding and dicta.2 Even 
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 1 Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2006). 
 2 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996); 
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2007); Tate v. 
Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2005); Cetacean Cmty. v. 
Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2004); People v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 1126, 
1135-37 (Ill. 2003); State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 495-99 (Md. 2008) (Raker, J., 
dissenting); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 177-
78 (1996); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
953 (2005); Ruggero Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss 
It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); Larry Alexander, Constrained 
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989); David Coale & Wendy Couture, Loud 
Rules, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 715, 716 (2007); Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1952); 
Michael Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (1994); Thomas 
Fowler, Holding, Dictum . . . Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139 (2003); Henry J. 
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when judges and scholars have articulated seemingly workable 
definitions, difficulty still remains in applying them to real 
cases. This debate has gone on for so long that one questions 
whether the problem can ever be resolved. But most of the 
debate to date has focused on determining what qualifies as 
holding—and therefore by negative inference—what qualifies 
as dicta. Some authors have attempted to clarify existing 
definitions,3 while others have proposed new definitions.4 Yet 
little attention has been paid to why, even after substantial 
consideration, lawyers and judges continue to confuse dicta for 
holding and holding for dicta. No doubt, the distinction is 
difficult to articulate, and that alone suggests that confusion in 
the application is inevitable. However, even if such confusion is 
unavoidable, understanding the reasons that underlie it may 
allow us to establish practices that would help clarify the 
holding/dicta distinction.  
Because of the rule-making power judges enjoy under 
principles of stare decisis,5 our judicial system depends on 
  
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
383, 385-86 (1964); Arthur Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 
YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEG. 
ED. 431 (1989); Leval, supra note 1; Adam Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial 
Lawmaking, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 545 (2004); Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme 
Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75 (2008); Patricia 
M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1408 (1995). 
 3  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2; Dorf, supra note 2. 
 4  See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 2, at 1044-94. 
 5 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 371-82; Leval, supra note 1, at 1258-59; 
Steinman, supra note 2, at 552; Aldisert, supra note 2, at 607, 628; Frederick Schauer, 
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 886 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision 
Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006) (“[A]ny first year law student knows that 
judges make law constantly.”).  
  The subject of stare decisis continues to capture attention. Stephen Colbert 
recently dedicated a segment of The Colbert Report to the principle of stare decisis. 
That segment, “The Word—Prece-Don’t” (mocking “precedent”), began with Colbert 
saying: “I believe in America’s legal system, except when it makes rulings I don’t like.” 
The Colbert Report, The Word—Prece-Don’t (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 
27, 2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/262612/ 
january-27-2010/the-word---prece-don-t [hereinafter Colbert Report]. He added that 
those decisions are lasting because of stare decisis. Id. He then noted, however, that 
“Chief Justice John Roberts has a brilliant legal strategy to get around following 
precedent.” Id. Colbert criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). Colbert Report, supra. Colbert claimed that Justice Roberts’s reliance on 
the “two ‘spirited dissents’” in a 1990 decision as a reason to overrule that authority, 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 922, will disrupt stare decisis. Colbert Report, supra. 
Although Colbert acknowledged that there is “ample precedent for ignoring precedent” 
(citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)), “[a]ccording to Chief Justice Roberts, any 
Supreme Court precedent that was not unanimous is now in question.” Id. Colbert 
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understanding what is and what is not a holding. Everyone 
agrees that subsequent courts are bound only by a prior case’s 
holding.6 But too often lawyers argue for, and judges treat, 
extraneous statements made in a prior case—that is, dicta—as 
holding. This ratcheting up of persuasive law into binding law 
is problematic on a number of fronts. To the extent that courts 
treat dicta as holding, they are more likely to reach incorrect 
decisions, to exceed their judicial authority, and to generate 
illegitimate results. 
This article aims to identify the causes that lead to the 
repeated conflation of dicta with holding. Based on these 
underlying causes, it advances a few tentative proposals to 
reduce the confusion between holding and dicta and its 
detrimental impact on the judicial system. Part I discusses the 
distinction between holding and dicta. It also identifies the 
major justifications for the distinction: accuracy, judicial 
authority, and legitimacy. Part II provides a series of concrete 
examples to demonstrate the problems that ensue when courts 
blur holding and dicta and how that results in dicta being 
elevated to holding.  
Part III identifies three potential culprits for the 
holding/dicta confusion, which remains despite the vast 
quantity of ink spilt attempting to clarify the distinction. The 
first cause is the recursive nature of the legal system, which 
essentially causes a “ripple effect.” Judges confuse holding and 
dicta, which then confuses lawyers; lawyers blur holding and 
dicta, which then confuses judges.7 And both groups may be 
confused even further by the unresolved scholarly debate on 
the topic.8  
The second cause of confusion is the tendency of courts 
to mimic the Supreme Court.9 The purpose, structure, and 
practice of the Supreme Court differ greatly from those of other 
federal courts and of state courts. The Supreme Court sets 
broad policy, which invites espousing dicta that would be 
unnecessary if the Court’s sole function were to narrowly 
resolve litigants’ disputes.10 The Court also issues less than one 
  
concluded that “[f]uture courts must respect Justice Roberts’s decision that he doesn’t 
have to respect previous decisions.” Id. 
 6  See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 2, at 957; Aldisert, supra note 2, at 607; 
Leval, supra note 1, at 1259. 
 7  See infra Part III.A. 
 8  See infra note 111. 
 9  See infra Part III.B. 
 10  See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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hundred opinions each year, and those opinions tend to be 
lengthy, allowing more space for extraneous commentary—
which, in judicial terms, means dicta.11 Yet other courts look to 
the Supreme Court in formulating their own judicial opinions.12 
This exacerbates the confusion between holding and dicta.  
The third cause is the overemphasis on words, phrases, 
and quotations to the exclusion of legal principles.13 Holdings 
are rarely presented in neatly packaged statements. To 
determine the holding of a case, the reader must analyze the 
facts, issues, rationales, and result of that case.14 In contrast to 
the difficult task of determining a case’s holding, it is often 
easy to locate language in an opinion that, on its face, supports 
a particular position, even when the case itself does not stand 
for that proposition.15 This reliance on words, phrases, and 
quotations increases the likelihood that dicta will be confused 
for a court’s actual holding. This overemphasis has evolved for 
a number of reasons. First, the changing nature of opinion 
writing—caused by increasing case loads and the greater 
reliance on law clerks—plays a part.16 Second, the ability via 
electronic legal research to search for key words rather than 
broader concepts contributes as well.17 Third, current citation 
rules reflect a bias toward statements made by courts over case 
holdings.18 And fourth, changes in broader society—changes to 
which the legal community is not immune—suggest an 
overemphasis on words, phrases, and quotations.19  
Finally, Part IV concludes, suggesting some potential 
solutions to minimize the confusion between holding and dicta, 
and ways to mitigate its negative consequences. First, 
education is perhaps the single most promising antidote to this 
problem.20 Second, increasing judicial resources would allow for 
more time to be spent on each opinion, also reducing the 
confusion between holding and dicta.21 Finally, changes to key 
citation and ethical rules would provide a mechanism for 
  
 11  See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 12  See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
 13  See infra Part III.C. 
 14  See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 155-72 and accompanying text. 
 16  See infra Part III.C.1. 
 17  See infra Part III.C.2. 
 18  See infra Part III.C.3. 
 19  See infra Part III.C.4. 
 20  See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text. 
 21  See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
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lawyers and judges to make it explicit when they were relying 
on dicta and ensure that they would be properly motivated to 
pay attention to the distinction between holding and dicta.22 
I. REASONS FOR THE HOLDING/DICTA DISTINCTION  
Much has been written about the holding/dicta 
distinction, both by judges and by scholars.23 A holding is 
generally thought of as those parts of a judicial opinion that are 
“necessary” to the result.24 Dictum, on the other hand, is 
anything in a judicial opinion that is not the holding.25 But the 
distinction is more difficult to capture in practice than these 
narrow definitions suggest.26 In light of the problems created by 
the blurred holding/dicta distinction, a number of judges and 
scholars have attempted to create a more workable definition of 
“holding” than those parts of the opinion “necessary to the 
result.”27 The majority of attempts fall within one of two camps: 
(1) a holding is limited to the facts plus the outcome;28 and (2) a 
  
 22  See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text. 
 23 See supra note 2. For a clear and relatively short summary of the scholarly 
debate, see Taylor, supra note 2, at 97-100. 
 24 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 435; Coale, supra note 2, at 726; 
Dorf, supra note 2, at 2003. 
  Abramowicz and Stearns propose a new definition: “A holding consists of 
those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are 
actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. 
If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.” Abramowicz, supra note 
2, at 961.  
 25 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 435; Leval, supra note 1, at 1257 
(“To say that a court’s statement is a dictum is to say that the statement is not the 
holding.”).  
 26 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 25 (“I should add a word about the 
distinction between holding and dictum, the existence of which all lawyers are trained 
to acknowledge, but the determination of which proves in practice to be quite 
controversial.”); Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 509 (“Every lawyer thinks he knows 
what [dictum] means, yet few lawyers think much more about it. Nonthinking and 
overuse combine to make for fuzziness.”); Dorf, supra note 2, at 2003, 2028; Leval, 
supra note 1, at 1258; see also Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting the “line is not always easy to draw” but concluding in that case that the 
statement at issue was non-binding dicta). The distinction may be difficult in part 
because, as some have argued, precedent is a “matter of degree.” See, e.g., Dorf, supra 
note 2, at 2050; Dictum Revisited, supra note 2, at 518. 
 27 See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 2; Alexander, supra note 2; Dorf, supra note 
2; Goodhart, supra note 2, Leval, supra note 1. 
 28 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 2, at 29-30. Under the “facts plus outcome” 
theory, limiting the holding to the underlying facts and the final result ensures courts 
do not go beyond the particular case before them and create broad or prospective rules 
that bind others. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 2, at 607; Goodhart, supra note 2, at 
162, 179, 182. This approach is appealing, most significantly because it is arguably 
easier to identify the facts and outcome of a given decision than it is to articulate the 
rationale/reasoning. However, judges rarely state every relevant fact in an opinion, and 
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holding includes the rationale or reasoning a court employs to 
reach a particular result.29  
For purposes of this article, the precise definition of 
holding (and therefore dicta) is immaterial. Even using a 
liberal definition of holding, which would include the rationale 
supporting the court’s decision, lawyers and judges regularly 
treat dicta like a case’s holding.30 Many have pointed out the 
plethora of problems that ensue when the distinction is not 
preserved.31 In addition to the general instability that arises 
  
judicial efficiency suggests this might be justified, especially when the outcome is a 
relatively foregone conclusion, as in many criminal appeals. Additionally, the facts in a 
particular case are almost never identical to the facts in a subsequent case. See 
Aldisert, supra note 2, at 613-17. 
 29 See generally Dorf, supra note 2, at 2024. Under the rationale/reasoning 
approach, courts are more able to determine how broadly or narrowly the facts from a 
previous case should be interpreted. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 2, at 385-86; Leval, 
supra note 1, at 1256-57; see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 
2001). Under this theory, the underlying principles in a judicial opinion are binding. In 
addition to resolving concerns about the level of factual abstraction, the main benefit of 
this approach is stability: judges have less ability to distinguish binding precedent 
simply because they do not wish to follow it. Dorf, supra note 2, at 2024. If the 
rationale is the same, the later court is bound. Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 
431 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “the holding of a case includes, 
besides the facts and the outcome, the reasoning essential to that outcome”). However, 
discerning the rationale or reasoning from a prior case is not always easy to do. Dorf, 
supra note 2, at 2040. 
 30 See infra notes 81-102 and accompanying text. Literary critics, however, 
would challenge even the underlying distinction between holding and dicta. They argue 
that “there are no determinate meanings and that the stability of the text is an 
illusion.” STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 312 (1980). Applying this principle to the law, case 
holdings are neither firm nor universally determinable. Instead, literary critics argue 
that each reader’s interaction with the text is what creates meaning, and that meaning 
is necessarily influenced by the reader’s experiences and perspectives. See, e.g., id. at 2 
(arguing that meaning is not “embedded in the text” leaving the reader to simply 
accurately identify that meaning; instead, “meaning develops . . . in a dynamic 
relationship with the reader’s expectations, projections, conclusions, judgments, and 
assumptions”); James Boyd White, Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1398 
(2002) (“Any claim that the law is this or that, or should be read in this or that way, 
must be made with the awareness that someone else, with adverse interests, may 
challenge it.”). And even if holdings can be determined, “all readers of legal texts, 
judges as well as law students, subconsciously supply multiple contexts when they 
read, whether they believe they do or not.” Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against 
the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 166 (1993). 
For a good summary of this debate, see Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or 
Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 900-03 
(2002). These criticisms have some merit but are beyond the scope of this article, which 
presumes for the sake of argument that case holdings are determinable, and therefore 
the distinction between holding and dicta is valid. 
 31 See, e.g., Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2007); State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 495 (Md. 2008) (“Whether the statement is dicta or a 
holding is not merely an academic exercise, but instead, has real significance in the event 
there is a retrial of this case, for several reasons.”) (Raker, J., dissenting); Abramowicz, 
supra note 2, at 958; Dorf, supra note 2, at 2004; Leval, supra note 1, at 1250. 
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when rules are unclear,32 certain legal claims require that we 
be able to readily determine holdings.33  
To combat these general and specific problems, the 
three most persuasive rationales for maintaining the 
distinction between holding and dicta are: (1) accuracy, (2) 
judicial authority, and (3) legitimacy.  
A.  Accuracy 
Accuracy refers to the likelihood that a court’s decision 
is actually correct.34 In a judicial system based upon stare 
decisis, reaching the “correct” result is important because 
holdings bind future courts, so the impact of a single decision is 
often magnified. And a court is simply more likely to be right 
when all the arguments relevant to a particular point are 
articulated, when a judge thoroughly considers all of those 
arguments, and when the point is essential to the outcome or 
decision.35 Statements without full consideration of the merits36 
are more likely to be wrong for obvious reasons: counsel may 
not have argued the issue or fleshed out the range of options, 
and the court may not have devoted much time or effort to 
resolving the problem.  
Even when a court has thoroughly considered the 
issue,37 if the statement has no impact on the merits, a court is 
  
 32 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 2004-05; Leval, supra note 1, at 1255. 
 33 For example, in order to pierce a public official’s qualified immunity, the 
plaintiff has to demonstrate both that the defendant violated her constitutional right 
and that “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged 
misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). When holdings and 
dicta are indistinguishable, it is difficult to imagine any “clearly established” rights. 
 34 Dorf, supra note 2, at 2000; see also Coale, supra note 2, at 725.  
 35 Leval, supra note 1, at 1255 (“The distinction [between holding and dicta] 
is not a mere technicality. . . . [C]ourts are more likely to exercise flawed, ill-considered 
judgment, more likely to overlook salutary cautions and contraindications, more likely 
to pronounce flawed rules, when uttering dicta than when deciding their cases.”); see 
also Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 434 (“Courts are most to be trusted when they focus 
on particular disputes. . . . What courts decide, therefore, is much more reliable than 
their passing comments on peripherally related legal subjects.”).   
 36 These statements are termed “obiter dicta” and they tend to be the most 
suspect in terms of accuracy. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 
118 P.3d 1110, 1116 n.9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 1126, 
1136 (Ill. 2003); Aldisert, supra note 2, at 609; Leval, supra note 1, at 1260.  
  Some courts suggest that even obiter dicta, when issued by “a court of last 
resort,” can be binding absent contrary authority. Williams, 788 N.E.2d at 1136 
(quoting the dissenting opinion of the lower court judge questioning “why the Supreme 
Court bothered to publish the dicta that we have decided to ignore”).  
 37 These statements, termed “judicial dicta” or “considered dicta,” are those 
statements made after full and careful consideration of the issues but that are not 
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more likely to be wrong.38 In these instances, the court has less 
incentive to ensure the “correct” decision because it is not 
binding on the parties before the court,39 much less future 
litigants.40 
  
essential to the result. See, e.g., Coale, supra note 2, at 727-28; Taylor, supra note 2, at 
93-94; see also Williams, 788 N.E.2d at 1136.  
  Courts and commentators are less concerned with the accuracy of judicial 
dicta because it was more thoroughly considered than obiter dicta. See, e.g., Red 11, 
LLC v. Conserv. Comm’n of Fairfield, 980 A.2d 917, 927 n.9 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) 
(stating that considered dicta is binding). The Red 11, LLC court justified reliance on 
dicta in a previous opinion by the Appellate Court of Connecticut with this language: 
“As we have previously recognized, . . . it is not dictum when a court of [appeal] 
intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not 
necessarily decisive of, the controversy . . . . Rather, such action constitutes an act of the 
court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.” Id. (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted).  
  The quoted passage, although cited to an earlier Connecticut case, 
originated in a 1922 Wisconsin case, Chase v. American Cartage Co., 186 N.W. 598, 599 
(Wis. 1922). That court stated, however, not that the considered dicta of any court of 
appeal (the bracketed language above) is binding, but that the considered dicta from a 
court of last resort was binding. Id. Furthermore, the decision in Chase relied on 
rulings in the alternative (first that the court would not extend a rule, and second that 
the court would overrule the principle to begin with), and most courts recognize 
alternative rulings as binding holdings, not dicta, in the first place. Id. 
  Similarly, some argue that judicial dictum is binding “absent a cogent 
reason for departing from it.” Phelps Dodge Corp., 118 P.3d at 1116; see also Williams, 
788 N.E.2d at 1136 (arguing judicial dicta “should receive dispositive weight in an 
inferior court”). Yet because it is not necessary for the result, even if thoughtfully 
contemplated, most posit that it remains dicta and has no binding power over future 
courts. Coale, supra note 2, at 727-28 (but noting that because the accuracy concerns 
are absent, judicial dicta is afforded “greater deference” than “ordinary dicta,” with 
courts treating judicial dicta “almost like holdings”). Furthermore, dicta in this 
category still suffer from the second and third reasons articulated for rejecting its 
ability to bind future courts: the issuing court exceeded its judicial authority to 
promulgate the statement unless it was necessary to the case before the court, and its 
promulgation is arguably illegitimate. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text. 
 38 Judge Leval points out that when a declared rule has “no consequence for 
the case”—i.e., it is dicta—courts are unlikely to pay much attention to the rule. “In my 
experience, when courts declare rules that have no consequence for the case, their 
cautionary mechanism is often not engaged. They are far more likely in these 
circumstances to fashion defective rules, and to assert misguided propositions, which 
have not been fully thought through.” Leval, supra note 1, at 1263 (emphasis added). 
 39 Although this argument is somewhat circular—considered dicta is less 
likely to be accurate because the court knows it is non-binding dicta, and the 
holding/dicta distinction should be preserved to prevent inaccurate decisions—it 
remains true that courts should bind future parties only when there exists the highest 
level of confidence in those decisions. For example, courts regularly exercise their 
discretion to denote opinions as “unpublished,” eliminating any binding effect on future 
litigants. Amy E. Sloan, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion 
of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 765 (2009). 
 40 Even for case holdings, the widespread practice of designating judicial 
opinions as “unpublished,” and therefore non-binding, demonstrates the need to 
restrict the reach of judicial decisions when there is less confidence in their accuracy. 
J. Thomas Sullivan, Unpublished Opinions and No Citation Rules in the Trial Courts, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 421 (2005); cf. Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: 
Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. 
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This result is not unique to dicta; courts similarly 
cannot rule, and therefore cannot create binding precedent, in 
cases absent standing41 or when the decision is moot.42 When a 
party does not have standing or a decision would be moot, the 
opportunities and incentives for a full adversarial process are 
lessened; the same holds true when a court espouses dicta. In 
addition to ensuring the court is within its authority by 
deciding an actual case or controversy,43 these requirements are 
more likely to result in the “right” decision.44  
Some courts seem to defer to the deciding court, 
granting special consideration to the intent of the court issuing 
judicial dicta.45 Rarely, though, does a court’s intention appear 
to be dispositive.46 As Judge Leval so clearly articulated, 
  
REV. 705 (2006) (arguing that courts should have addressed the propriety of issuing 
unpublished opinions in the first place when they debated whether to adopt a rule 
allowing citation to unpublished opinions). 
 41 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-82 (1992); see also Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (standing focuses on “whether the party invoking” jurisdiction 
has “‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ and whether the dispute 
touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’”) (citations 
omitted). The Court added that “personal stake and interest . . . impart the necessary 
concrete adverseness” to the litigation, conferring standing. Id. The “nexus” 
requirement in turn provides confidence in the final decision. Id. at 101-06. 
 42 See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The 
Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992). And although mootness has an 
Article III component, that cannot be the exclusive justification, as exceptions are 
somewhat routinely granted. See, e.g., id. at 609; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
330 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 43 See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 460 
(2009) (standing ensures “that courts decide only those issues that are briefed and 
argued by stakeholders with an incentive to adequately represent their interests to the 
court, which in turn will produce better judicial decisions”). But see Schauer, supra 
note 5, at 918 (noting “real events, real parties, real controversies, and real 
consequences may have distorting effects as well as illuminating ones”).  
 45 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 118 P.3d 1110, 1116 n.9 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“‘Judicial dictum’ is a statement the court expressly declares to 
be a guide for future conduct and is therefore considered authoritative.”). 
 46 See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 
(1949) (noting it “is not what the prior judge intended that is of any importance; rather 
it is what the present judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, 
thinks should be the determining classification”); Abramowicz, supra note 2, at 955. 
But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (stating the Court’s “consideration is 
limited to the present circumstances”). The anticipated breadth or limits of a court’s 
decision arguably are of no consequence; the holding is binding, and the remainder, 
although it may be highly persuasive, is not binding. But see Teresa Godwin Phelps & 
Jenny Ann Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological 
Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 353, 355-62 (1985); Wald, 
supra note 2, at 1398 (“The way in which the court describes its own holding may also 
be important for its future precedential status. Sometimes the court emphasizes the 
narrowness of what it is deciding; at other times it tells the audience that this is a 
broader benchmark opinion, putting other prior cases in perspective.”). Authorial 
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“dictum is not converted into holding by . . . preceding it with 
‘We hold that . . . .’”47  
B.  Judicial Authority 
Courts can only create binding law when they actually 
have the power to do so.48 Several authors have commented on 
the potential constitutional problems created by federal courts 
espousing dicta.49 Article III’s50 Case-or-Controversy Clause 
limits the courts’ power to issue rulings by requiring that an 
actual dispute exist between two or more adverse parties before 
the matter can be decided. Courts are specifically precluded 
from legislating,51 as that power is reserved to Congress.52 
When a court suggests what the proper result should be under 
circumstances not before that court, the case-or-controversy 
requirement is violated. Even for state courts, separation of 
powers necessarily limits courts to resolving the dispute before 
them.53 Legislatures should legislate and courts should decide 
only the cases they are presented with, not future disputes.  
  
intent posits that a text should be interpreted consistent with the intent of the author. 
Phelps & Pitts, supra, at 357-62. In an article comparing text-centered interpretation 
with interpreter-centered interpretation, Phelps describes the view of Italian legal 
historian Emilio Betti as follows: “the author’s meaning is the norm by which the 
validity of any interpretation is measured.” Id. at 359. 
 47 Leval, supra note 1, at 1257. 
 48 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 2, at 2000; Coale, supra note 2, at 726. But see 
Peter Schanck, Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and 
Legal Research, 82 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 5 (1990) (“There is, of course, disagreement among 
the theorists about the degree of discretion available to judges.”).  
  Some authors refer to this concept as “legitimacy.” See, e.g., Dorf, supra 
note 2, at 2000, 2002. This article uses the term “legitimacy” to refer to a different 
rationale supporting the holding/dicta distinction. See infra notes 67-71 and 
accompanying text.  
 49 See generally Dorf, supra note 2; see also Leval, supra note 1, at 1259-60.  
 50 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 51 F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
60 ALA. L. REV. 895, 902-03 (2009). Despite this, judges create binding rules by virtue 
of stare decisis, Leval, supra note 1, at 1258-59, and as a result of the “canonical role” 
of the words in their judicial opinions. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 682, 684 (1986).  
 52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 53 Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of 
Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1546-47 (1997). Justice Peters notes: 
Jurisprudentially, separation of powers represents a view of the body politic 
that, although not a prerequisite to a republican form of government, is 
nonetheless fundamental to any discussion of the appropriate ordering of 
governmental responsibilities, state or federal. Operationally, separation of 
powers provides doctrinal guideposts for courts to consider when drawing the 
line between the role of the judiciary and the role of popularly elected 
political institutions. Politically, separation of powers safeguards the 
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Furthermore, courts exceed their judicial authority 
when they take advantage of the confusion surrounding the 
holding/dicta distinction. That confusion creates opportunities 
for courts and counsel to behave disingenuously;54 the preferred 
result can be reached by adjusting the level of deference due a 
prior opinion. When judges want to reach a particular result, 
even when it has not yet been held by a higher court or the 
same court, they can rely on dicta and, labeling it as holding, 
declare they are “bound” to follow the earlier case.55 Because it 
is substantially more difficult to overrule a case than to decide 
a case of first impression (and impossible for a lower court to do 
so),56 an unfair and insurmountable burden has been imposed 
  
independence of the courts while providing a principled foundation for 
appropriately defined judicial deference to the views of other community 
policymakers. 
Id.; see also Harold F. See, The Separation of Powers and the Public Policy Role of the 
State Court in a Routine Case, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 345, 352-53 (2004); G. Alan Tarr, 
Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 329 (2003). 
 54 See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 2, at 1024; Dictum Revisited, supra note 
2, at 516; Dorf, supra note 2, at 2029.  
 55 Chief Justice Roberts has accused Justice Breyer of this maneuver:  
Justice Breyer’s dissent takes a different approach to these cases, one that 
fails to ground the result it would reach in law. Instead, it selectively relies 
on inapplicable precedent and even dicta while dismissing contrary holdings, 
alters and misapplies our well-established legal framework for assessing 
equal protection challenges to express racial classifications, and greatly 
exaggerates the consequences of today’s decision. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735-36 
(2007). Chief Justice Roberts’s criticism of the dissent’s use of dicta spans six pages. 
See id. at 735-41. 
  Justice Breyer responded by relying on the blurred distinction between 
holding and dictum: 
[T]he plurality downplays the importance of Swann and related cases by 
frequently describing their relevant statements as “dicta.” These criticisms, 
however, miss the main point. Swann did not hide its understanding of the 
law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a footnote, unread but by experts. 
It set forth its view prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine 
Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. 
The basic problem with the plurality’s technical “dicta”-based response lies in 
its overly theoretical approach to case law, an approach that emphasizes rigid 
distinctions between holdings and dicta in a way that serves to mask the 
radical nature of today’s decision. Law is not an exercise in mathematical 
logic. And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not 
always divide neatly into “holdings” and “dicta.” 
Id. at 831 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 56 E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) 
(noting the “obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary 
necessity marks its outer limit”); see also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 581 (1987). At least arguably, courts should only explicitly, not impliedly, 
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by characterizing dicta as binding precedent.57 It is true that 
counsel can, and often do, spend countless hours debating 
whether a particular statement is in fact holding or dicta.58 But 
the lack of clarity in defining holding in the first place makes 
the task far more difficult and far more likely to yield illogical 
and potentially unfair results. Similarly, when confronted with 
binding authority that arguably answers the question, counsel 
and courts often evade the effect of that law by using the label 
“dicta”59 and declaring the authority inapplicable to the case at 
hand.60 
It should go without saying that not all uses of the 
“holding” and “dicta” labels are disingenuous, nor are all 
instances when courts create dicta attempts to unreasonably 
usurp their legitimate power. Courts are often motivated by 
practical considerations such as judicial efficiency. When 
writing an opinion explaining how a party, especially a repeat 
player like the government, got it “wrong,” it makes some sense 
to explain what they could have done to get it “right” to avoid 
repeatedly litigating the issue.61 Because the case where they 
  
overrule earlier decisions. United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 439 (1st Cir. 
2002); United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 219 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 57 Schauer, supra note 5, at 909 (“As long as precedent matters . . . there is 
the omnipresent possibility that any mistake will be systematically more powerful than 
any later attempts to correct it.”). 
 58  See, e.g., Jennifer Bruch Hogan & Richard P. Hogan, Jr., Charging the 
Jury in Changing Times, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 973, 988 (2005); Bruce A. McGlauflin, 
Some Confusing Things Happened on the Way to Modernizing Maine’s Adverse 
Possession Law, 25 ME. B.J. 38, 43 (2010). 
 59 Questioning the distinction, Professor Schauer notes that we often speak of 
“‘mere’ dicta as a way to justify ignoring some language in a case, but it is worthwhile 
to consider the effect of having to go through that exercise compared with the situation 
in which no such troublesome language exists.” Schauer, supra note 56, at 580 n.22. 
 60 Judge Wald identifies the rhetorical styles courts adopt in labeling 
statements as dicta or holding. Wald, supra note 2, at 1405-06. And Justice Breyer, 
responding to Chief Justice Roberts, criticizes him of misusing the “dicta” label, 
although not himself willing to use the “holding” label: 
[I]f the plurality now chooses to reject that principle, it cannot adequately 
justify its retreat simply by affixing the label “dicta” to reasoning with which 
it disagrees. Rather, it must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it 
would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless 
others have built upon over time, and which the law has continuously 
embodied. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 61 See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). That case involved search warrants for digital evidence. Some 
members of the court criticized the majority for setting out five “procedures” they 
trusted would “prove a useful tool for the future,” id. at 1006-07: 
Although I can appreciate the majority’s desire to set forth a new framework 
with respect to searches of commingled electronic data, I am wary of this 
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got it “right” is not actually before the court, however, the 
court’s opinions about permissible conduct are dicta.62 
Consequently, this thoughtful and helpful approach to 
resolving the problem has the potential for confusing the 
holding/dicta distinction.63  
Furthermore, courts may misconstrue, and hence 
mislabel, prior dicta as holding simply in error. Judge Leval 
asks why “courts accept earlier dicta as holding”64 and responds 
simply that judges “are human.”65 Unless the subsequent court 
disagrees with the proposition of the earlier court, there is not 
much incentive to take the time necessary to “determine 
whether the proposition was in fact a holding.”66 
  
prophylactic approach. The majority’s prescriptions go significantly beyond 
what is necessary for it to resolve this case. Accordingly, its protocols are 
dicta and might be best viewed as a “best practices” manual, rather than 
binding law.  
Id. at 1012-13 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Wald 
appears to agree with the Ninth Circuit dissenters, but also notes: “Still, one judge’s 
dicta may be another judge’s coherent rationale.” Wald, supra note 2, at 1410; see also 
POSNER, supra note 2, at 177-78. 
 62 They are thoughtful, considered dicta, because the court contrasted these 
reasons with what in fact happened to help determine the actions were wrong—but 
most would argue such language is also not truly necessary to the opinion. This is true 
at least under the facts plus outcome approach, discussed supra note 28. 
 63 Transparency in most contexts is desired, and when espousing dicta, even 
for good reasons, courts can minimize confusion by explicitly labeling those statements 
as dicta. 
  For example, most courts and scholars contend that alternative holdings 
are binding. See, e.g., Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“[I]n this circuit additional or alternative holdings are not dicta, but instead are as 
binding as solitary holdings.”); United States v. Wright, 496 F.3d 371, 375 n.10 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (declaring it is “well-settled that alternative holdings are binding, they are 
not dicta”); Abramowicz, supra note 2, at 1028. 
  But some courts have concluded that alternative holdings are non-binding 
dicta, at least when one alternative holding involves a finding of unconstitutionality 
and the other ground, such as a procedural violation, does not require the court to 
reach the constitutional issue. Mt. Lebanon v. Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 368 A.2d 648, 
650-51 (Pa. 1977). “Since an alternative, non-constitutional ground existed and was 
discussed, the statement in question was not only dictum, but dictum that flew in the 
face of existing case law and proper appellate procedure.” Id. at 650. 
 64 Leval, supra note 1, at 1269. 
 65 Id. He also points out that lower courts may fear higher courts will react 
poorly to having their statements characterized as “dicta.” Id. 
 66 Id. (“Determining whether a statement of law is a holding or dictum can be 
a time-consuming task. You must read the full opinion, understand what were the 
facts, what question was in dispute, how the court resolved it, and what role the 
proposition played in justifying the judgment.”). 
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C. Legitimacy  
It is a basic tenet of the rule of law that similarly 
situated people ought to be treated similarly.67 Stare decisis 
helps further this goal of consistent legal outcomes.68 Elevating 
dicta into holding, however, disrupts this basic tenet. By 
treating dicta as holding, the court treats as similar those 
litigants who are not similarly situated. And by declaring the 
holding of a prior court to be dicta, the court treats disparately 
those litigants who are in fact similarly situated. 
Not only is this result unfair, but it also creates 
instability in the law that threatens its very legitimacy.69 This 
concept is analogous to the level of deference a reviewing court 
is required to give a lower court’s decisions.70 If a reviewing 
court reverses a lower court simply because it would have ruled 
differently, even though the lower court had the power to make 
the decisions it did, unpredictability and illegitimacy result. 
  
 67 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 
747, 758 (1982) (defending appellate review as “necessary to preserve the most basic 
principle of jurisprudence that ‘we must act alike in all cases of like nature’”) (citations 
omitted). Judge Friendly adds that this “jurisprudential rule of like treatment 
demands consistency not only between cases that are precisely alike but among those 
where the differences are not significant.” Id. He then provides an example: “[W]e 
cannot have one rule for a man riding a white horse on Monday and another for one 
riding a black horse on Tuesday—even though some old cases indicated it might be as 
well never to be injured on Sunday.” Id. 
  The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws likewise 
requires similarly situated people be treated similarly, at least unless the government 
has a reason of sufficient strength to support the distinction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (acknowledging that the 
“Fourteenth Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection 
of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for 
one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons,” yet 
striking on equal protection grounds Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited any 
judicial, legislative, or executive anti-discrimination protections on behalf of 
homosexuals). 
 68 This holds true for corporations as well; contract law depends on 
consistency for its validity and reliability. See generally 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:1, at 15 (4th ed. 2007) 
(“The principles governing the law of contracts . . . are fundamental in virtually every 
field of law.”). 
 69 See McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (identifying 
stability and predictability as requiring stare decisis). Judge Posner notes that a 
similar reduction in “the authority of judicial decisions” would result if it were readily 
apparent that an opinion was “the work of [a] law clerk” (as opposed to the judge, and 
as opposed to simply having been drafted by the clerk). POSNER, supra note 2, at 149. 
This knowledge would reduce the “attention judges and lawyers . . . pay” to the broad 
holding of the case. Id.  
 70 See Friendly, supra note 67, at 754 (defining “discretion” as “how far an 
appellate court is bound to sustain rulings of the trial judge which it disapproves but 
does not consider to be outside the ball park”). 
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The power of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for 
that of a lower court is similar to the power of a subsequent 
court to ignore existing precedent; it can be done, but the court 
should only do so legitimately—when, for example, the trial 
court has exceeded the scope of its power, or when the cases are 
truly distinguishable.71 Arbitrariness is simply not legitimate. 
Because courts need to reach accurate decisions to act 
within their authority and to act legitimately, the holding/dicta 
distinction is significant. Yet lawyers and judges routinely 
confuse the two and, most importantly, treat dicta as if it were 
holding.  
II. EXAMPLES OF ELEVATING DICTA TO HOLDING 
Dictum is generally not a problem until it is treated by a 
subsequent court as a holding.72 Consider the following 
examples, presuming the subsequent courts would be bound by 
the prior courts’ holdings: 
Example 1: 




 71 This effect is further compounded by the lack of appeal when the dictum is 
created. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 1, at 1262. 
 72 This is distinguished from one court finding persuasive the holding of a 
non-binding court. That is not only permissible, but often wise and expected. See, e.g., 
Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1958 (2008). The 
key distinction is that the principle from the first case was in fact a holding, and even if 
not binding on the second court because of jurisdictional forces, the holding in the first 
case was thoroughly considered, and therefore likely accurate. Furthermore, there are 
no legitimacy problems, including constitutional issues or concerns of 
disingenuousness, because the first case is clearly not binding. 
 73 For example, the United States Supreme Court issued dicta in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In Carolene Products, the 
Court ruled that a statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of filled milk was 
constitutionally proper under Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, and that it did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 147, 148. The Court applied 
the rational basis test which includes a presumption of constitutionality, but added in a 
footnote that this presumption may not apply when “legislation appears on its face to 
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.” Id. at 152 n.4. The Court 
acknowledged that “[i]t is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about 
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other 
types of legislation,” but went on to identify a number of situations where that may be 
the case. Id. (emphasis added). 
  The Court also noted: 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of 
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; 
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Step 2: Case B addresses the issue posed by the dictum in Case A. 
Rather than viewing the issue as a case of first impression, the court 
in Case B treats the dictum in Case A as Case A’s holding and rules 
consistent with that dictum.
74 
Step 3: Case C arises, and it addresses the issue raised in Case B. It 
is now harder to overrule Case B than to decide the issue from a 
fresh perspective in the first place
75
—as Case B could and should 
have done. Yet the court in Case B did not fully consider the issue 
because it treated the dictum in Case A as a binding holding.
76 
  
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may 
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
  The Court cited two cases for its final speculation regarding “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities,” but neither of those two cases is on point. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819) (holding unconstitutional a 
state tax on a federal bank branch within that state); South Carolina State Highway 
Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2, 196 (1938) (holding South Carolina 
could constitutionally restrict the weight and size of trucks upon its highways). 
 74 The oft-quoted footnote four from Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4, 
has arguably created the current standard for equal protection challenges. In 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), the Court held that an 
initiative that prohibited certain types of student bussing for desegregation purposes 
violated equal protection. The Court relied, in part, on Carolene Products’ footnote four:  
And when the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on the 
ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome 
the “special condition” of prejudice, the governmental action seriously 
“curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities.” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 153 n.4 (1938). In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary’s 
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are “relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”  
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 486 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). San Antonio also relied on the footnote in Carolene 
Products in imposing strict scrutiny review. 411 U.S. at 105. Compounding the dicta 
problem, Carolene Products was a plurality opinion.  
 75 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 76 Carolene Products has not escaped the criticism of courts. See, e.g., Kovacs 
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Challenging Carolene 
Products’ footnote four in the First Amendment context, Justice Frankfurter pointed 
out:  
A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new 
constitutional doctrine, and the Carolene footnote did not purport to 
announce any new doctrine; incidentally, it did not have the concurrence of a 
majority of the Court. It merely rephrased and expanded what was said in 
Herndon v. Lowry and elsewhere. It certainly did not assert a presumption of 
invalidity against all legislation touching matters related to liberties 
protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. It merely 
stirred inquiry whether as to such matters there may be “narrower scope for 
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Example 2: 
Step 1: The court issues dictum in Case A. 
Step 2: The dictum in Case A is repeated in Case B; it is not 
followed, because it is not the holding of Case B, but the Court in 
Case B presents the dictum as Case A’s holding. 
Step 3: Case C arises, and the dictum in Cases A and B is actually 
relevant.
77
 Case C should be considered a case of first impression. 
But the court in Case C follows the dictum in Cases A and B—even 
though the statement is not the holding of those cases—because it 




operation of the presumption of constitutionality” and legislation regarding 
them is therefore “to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny.” 
Id. at 90-92 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 77 See, e.g., Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1265-66 
(11th Cir. 2007). In Ingram, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with this exact problem. The 
court had issued dicta in Keeton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 21 F.3d 
1064 (11th Cir. 1994). That dicta was repeated in a later case, Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 
1320 (11th Cir. 1998), and both statements were relied upon by the Commissioner in 
Ingram. The Ingram court noted that the Commissioner’s position was supported by 
“some of the language in Keeton and Falge, but neither Keeton nor Falge decided the 
issue we now face.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1264. The Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged 
the difficulty the earlier dicta posed for the district court: “In its review of Ingram’s 
case, the district court was understandably confounded by our dicta in Keeton and 
Falge” and therefore ruled erroneously. Id. at 1266. The court also noted that other 
circuits had labeled the dicta as Eleventh Circuit holdings. Id. They added: “We hope 
that our discussion of the dicta in Keeton and Falge will clear up this confusion to the 
benefit of both district courts within this Circuit and our sister circuits.” Id.  
 78 “Thoughtless repetition should not convert a dictum into law, but it 
manages to do so.” Leval, supra note 1, at 1273; see also infra notes 79-103 and 
accompanying text.  
  Similarly, Carolene Products’ reference to heightened scrutiny for racial 
groups may have influenced the Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). The Court applied the higher standard but found it was met, stating: “It should 
be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions 
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.” Id. at 216 (emphasis added). The Court offered no citations for this principle.  
  The Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), similarly made a broad 
statement paraphrasing Carolene Products with no citation: “In the case at bar, 
however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal 
application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification 
which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn 
according to race.” Loving, 388 U.S. at 9. Later in the opinion, the Loving Court cited 
Korematsu for the principle that Korematsu announced without citation:  
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial 
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 
“most rigid scrutiny,” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), 
and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the 
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial 
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
eliminate. 
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The problem is this: there is no incentive in Case A or B 
to fight about the statement, because it does not control the 
outcome.79 But by the time of Case C, courts treat the 
statement as such a long-standing principle that it becomes a 
holding without ever having been adjudicated. And it is nearly 
impossible to argue the principle on the merits because courts 
(and lawyers) are so used to hearing the principle that they 
believe there must be support; it must have actually been a 
court’s holding at some point, even if they cannot find the 
original source. But there was neither opportunity nor 
incentive to litigate the principle in Cases A or B. What started 
as an off-handed statement80 now has the power of precedent—
it became holding just because it was said so often. 
The following examples illustrate this point. First, the 
rule that employers do not have to reinstate employees 
following a strike is generally supported with a citation to the 
1938 United States Supreme Court case NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph Co.81 As recently as 1989, the Supreme 
Court characterized its earlier holding as follows: 
In Mackay Radio, . . . [w]e held that it was not an unfair labor 
practice . . . for the employer to have replaced the striking employees 
with others “in an effort to carry on the business,” or to have refused 
to discharge the replacements in order to make room for the strikers 
at the conclusion of the strike.
82 
  
Id. at 11. 
 79 Leval, supra note 1, at 1279 (“People do not appeal from abstract 
statements they don’t care about.”). And as Judge Leval notes, appeal is not possible 
for dicta; there is “no available correction mechanism.” Id. at 1262. 
 80 Leval, supra note 1, at 1267-68 (“Particularly to be feared is the scholarly, 
treatise-type opinion, which for no good reason lectures on the nature and origins of the 
doctrine, making pronouncements that have no consequence for the dispute. Although 
the court generally believes it is correctly explaining non-controversial matters, the 
practice is risky.”); see also Aldisert, supra note 2, at 609-10 (noting that framing the 
decision in terms of general “principles” is problematic; this “occurs when a court does 
not announce a narrow rule based solely on record facts, but embarks on an intellectual 
frolic of its own”). 
  In addition to including off-handed comments, some have opined that 
judges sometimes intentionally plant language in an opinion with the hope it will be 
followed by future courts. This may be the case with footnote four in Carolene Products, 
discussed supra notes 73-78. As noted by one commentator in the copyright context, we 
should pay closer attention to “loaded judicial rhetoric” because of its ability to 
“generate ‘doctrine’ as enduring as any ‘holding.’” Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal 
Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369, 
371 (2001). 
 81 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 82 TWA, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 433 (1989).  
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In Mackay Radio, however, the employer was required 
to reinstate the striking employees.83 Although the Court twice 
stated the general proposition that employers did not have to 
reinstate employees after a strike,84 it nevertheless held that 
the employer in that case did have to reinstate its employees.85 
The Court’s rationale was that an employer could not 
selectively determine which striking employees to reinstate 
based upon their union activity, which was precisely what the 
employer at Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. had done.86 The 
Court even characterized its own holding as follows: “We hold 
that we have jurisdiction; that the Board’s order [reinstating 
the striking employees] is within its competence and does not 
contravene any provision of the Constitution.”87 Yet courts 
continue to treat the dicta in Mackay Radio—the proposition 
that employers do not have to reinstate striking employees—as 
the case’s holding.88  
Examples with more problematic ramifications in other 
contexts abound, as demonstrated by Stern v. Schriro,89 a 
recent case in the District of Arizona. Stern considered whether 
a federal court could grant habeas corpus relief when the 
petitioner had not appealed his conviction to the Arizona 
Supreme Court.90 The court ruled that because discretionary 
review with the highest state court was not pursued, the 
petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred.91 
To justify this result, the court in Stern relied on 
language from a 1999 Ninth Circuit case, Swoopes v. Sublett.92 
The issue in Swoopes was similar to that in Stern: whether the 
petitioner was entitled to federal habeas relief despite not 
pursuing a discretionary appeal with the Arizona Supreme 
Court.93 In contrast to the ruling in Stern, the Ninth Circuit in 
Swoopes held that, despite not filing a petition for review with 
  
 83 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 336, 348, 351. 
 84 Id. at 345-46, 347.  
 85 Id. at 336, 348, 351. 
 86 Id. at 346-47.  
 87 Id. at 343. 
 88  See, e.g., NLRB. v. Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972) (citing Mackay 
Radio for the proposition that it is “settled that an employer may refuse to reinstate 
economic strikers if in the interim he has taken on permanent replacements”); NLRB v. 
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967). 
 89 No. CV 06-16-TUC-DCB, 2007 WL 201235 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2007). 
 90 Id. at *5. 
 91 Id. at *6. 
 92 Id. at *5 (citing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 93 Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1008. 
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the Arizona Supreme Court, the petitioner had properly 
exhausted his state appeal rights and the habeas petition 
should be considered on the merits.94 The different results in 
Stern and Swoopes were based on differences in the underlying 
sentences of the petitioners; the petitioner in Stern had been 
given a life sentence, and the petitioner in Swoopes had not 
received a life sentence.95  
Although the petitioner in Swoopes had not received a 
death sentence or life imprisonment, and hence any language 
about those sentences was unnecessary to the result, the Ninth 
Circuit in Swoopes quoted the following language from a 1984 
Arizona Supreme Court case96: “[i]n cases other than those 
carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, a decision by the 
court of appeals . . . exhausts a defendant’s right of appeal in 
this jurisdiction.”97  
This dictum in Swoopes about a life sentence or the 
death penalty was not only unnecessary—it was legally 
incorrect at the time Swoopes was decided.98 Ten years earlier, 
  
 94 Id. at 1011. The petitioner had properly appealed to the Arizona Court of 
Appeals, and that court denied his requested relief. Id. at 1009. 
 95 Id. at 1010-11. Swoopes had also not received the death penalty. 
 96 State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1984). The issue in Shattuck 
was whether defense counsel had adequately pursued his client’s appeal rights by 
appealing to the state’s intermediate court of appeals or whether he was required to 
petition for discretionary review with the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 156. In 
determining that the lawyer had no obligation to file the discretionary appeal, the 
court stated the following: “In cases other than those carrying a life sentence or the 
death penalty, a decision by the court of appeals and its search for error exhausts a 
defendant’s right of appeal in this jurisdiction.” Id. at 157.  
  At the time Shattuck was decided, controlling statutory law provided that 
appeals in cases involving a life sentence or the death penalty proceeded directly to the 
Arizona Supreme Court; the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear appeals 
in either of those instances. 1974 Ariz. Laws, Ch. 7, § 2 (codified as amended at ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-120.21(A)(1)) (providing appellate jurisdiction in the court of 
appeals in all actions “except criminal actions involving crimes for which a sentence of 
death or life imprisonment has actually been imposed”); 1974 Ariz. Laws, Ch. 7, § 3 
(codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4031 (1977)) (providing that 
appeals for “crimes for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment has actually 
been imposed may only be appealed to the supreme court”). The defendant in Shattuck 
was sentenced to ten years in prison, 684 P.2d at 155, and hence, his appeal to the 
court of appeals was sufficient. 
 97 Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (emphasis added).  
 98 The dictum was, although a dictum, an accurate statement of the legal test 
at the time Shattuck was decided. See supra note 96. But it was not the legal standard 
at the time Swoopes was decided—or by the time Stern was decided. See infra note 99 
and accompanying text. 
  At least one court has sharply criticized the Swoopes dicta and catalogued 
a significant number of courts that have relied upon that same language, despite the 
fact that it misstates current law. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929-31 (D. 
Ariz. 2007). The court in Crowell noted that the “dictum in Swoopes was nevertheless 
repeated in dictum in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2004).” Id. at 930. 
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the Arizona Legislature amended the statutes that provided for 
exclusive Arizona Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in 
cases of life imprisonment and granted that jurisdiction to the 
state court of appeals.99 And although the statement had no 
effect in Swoopes, it proved problematic in Stern. 
Citing Swoopes, the district court in Stern stated the 
following, with no indication that the statement was anything 
other than Swoopes’ holding: “State prisoners, except those 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment, exhaust state court 
remedies by presenting their claims to the Arizona Court of 
Appeals.”100 The court then added the following sentence, 
  
Furthermore, the court noted the “dictum in Swoopes was also repeated in a series of 
district court cases,” citing both Stern and a case from 2005 where the issue of life 
imprisonment was relevant, and a series of cases where it was not relevant to the 
outcome yet the dicta was repeated: 
See Saiers v. Schriro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9350, at *7-8, 12-13, 2007 WL 
473682, at *3, 5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2007) (involving a petitioner sentenced to 59 
years in prison); Stern v. Schriro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5504, at *13, 16, 
2007 WL 201235, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2007) (involving a petitioner 
sentenced to life in prison); Moyaert v. Steames, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93729, at *3, 7, 2006 WL 3808080, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2006) (4.5-year 
sentence); Batista de la Paz v. Elliott, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82734, at *4, 6, 
2006 WL 3292474, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2006) (6-year sentence); Alston v. 
Schriro, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79926, at *2, 17, 2006 WL 3147650, at *1, 5 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 31, 2006) (10-year sentence); Hurley v. Gaspar, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64008, at *9, 31, 2006 WL 2460918, at *2, 4 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2006) 
(17-year sentence); Tindall v. Schriro, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60909, at *3, 
10, 2006 WL 2361721, at *1, 6 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2006) (20-year sentence); 
Lange v. Frigo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44984, at *2, 14, 2006 WL 1735270, at 
*1, 5 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2006) (26-year sentence); Casner v. Gaspar, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10075, at *4, 16 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2006) (same) (not reported in 
Westlaw); Benson v. Haynes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27197, at *1, 4, 2005 WL 
2978604, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 13, 2005) (10-year sentence); Alvarez v. 
Schriro, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35319, at *2, 12-13, 2005 WL 3501409, at *1, 
4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2005) (22-year sentence); Lucero v. Savage, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40536, at *2, 10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2005) (sentence of 20 years plus 
life) (not reported in Westlaw); Greer v. Schriro, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
38889, at *2, 10 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2005) (12-year sentence) (not reported in 
Westlaw); Lopez v. Schriro, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28060, at *1, 3, 2005 WL 
3005603, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2005) (5-year sentence); Woods v. Schriro, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38984, at *4, 9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2005) (36-year 
sentence) (not reported in Westlaw); Benson v. Haynes, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27197, at *1, 4, 2005 WL 2978604, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 13, 2005) (10-
year sentence); Ross v. Schriro, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35314, at *2, 13 (D. 
Ariz. Aug. 18, 2005) (13.25-year sentence) (not reported in Westlaw); McCoy 
v. Stewart, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23689, at *3, 9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 2001) (15-
year sentence) (not reported in Westlaw). 
Crowell, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 930 n.4. 
 99 1989 Ariz. Laws, ch. 58, § 1 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-120.21(A)(1)); 1989 Ariz. Laws, ch. 58, § 2 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-4031). 
 100 Stern v. Schriro, No. CV 06-16-TUC-DCB, 2007 WL 201235, at *5 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 24, 2007).  
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followed by an “id.” cite referring to Swoopes: “When a life 
sentence has been imposed, the ‘complete round’ requires a 
defendant to seek discretionary review of his claims by the 
Arizona Supreme Court.”101  
This rule is in fact not the law, and it was never even 
the holding of any court before Stern in 2007.102 It was dicta, 
repeated over and over again, until it gained the force of law in 
a dispute where the statement actually mattered.  
This repetition of dicta, time after time, suggests courts 
are simply not concerned when that dicta has no practical 
effect in the case before them. As Judge Leval put it, “the court 
paid no price, and consequently paid little attention.”103  
III. IDENTIFYING REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM 
With a plethora of judicial decisions and scholarly 
articles addressing the subject, why does the distinction 
between holding and dicta remain blurry? Arguably the 
imprecise definition of holding (and therefore dicta) compounds 
the issue, and that problem is not likely to be solved anytime 
soon.104 But examples abound of courts and lawyers confusing 
dicta and holding under any definition, suggesting that the 
lack of a uniform definition is not the sole reason for the 
problem. 
This confusion exists for three main reasons. First, 
confusion is bound to breed more confusion; as long as some 
judges, some lawyers, or some scholars blur the distinction that 
lack of clarity will spread. Second, lower courts appear to be 
emulating the United States Supreme Court, and that Court is 
more likely to issue dicta and is simultaneously less restrained 
by the holding/dicta distinction. Third, the emphasis on words, 
phrases, and quotations, in lieu of focusing on the underlying 
facts, issues, and holdings of judicial opinions, almost ensures 
lawyers and judges will confuse holdings and dicta.  
  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at *6. 
 103 Leval, supra note 1, at 1263. 
 104 See generally Dorf, supra note 2. Even when definitions appear clear, as 
with appellate standards of review, applying them in practice can be challenging.  
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A. The Ripple Effect 
Judges are not the only participants in the legal system 
who treat dicta like holding. Lawyers do it.105 Law students do 
it.106 Some non-judges might be doing it because they are 
modeling the behavior of judges.107 If the judge thinks the 
distinction is irrelevant, why should the lawyer or law student 
care about the potential distinction? But lawyers may also 
influence judges to ignore the distinction.108 If the hired 
advocates are unwilling or unable to accurately identify 
holding versus dicta, the judge can hardly be faulted for not 
independently making the distinction.109  
The bottom line is this: there is a ripple effect that 
occurs when any of the players demonstrates an inability or an 
unwillingness to distinguish between holding and dicta.110 
  
 105 Judge Leval would counsel practitioners as follows: 
[I]n arguing to courts, you will need to be keenly aware what is holding and 
what is dictum. It is often the best way to undermine unfavorable language 
in a prior opinion. By the same token, it can alert you that your argument is 
built on a house of cards. 
Leval, supra note 1, at 1282. 
 106 Similarly, Judge Leval suggests it is the responsibility of law school 
professors to ensure our students “understand and are alert to the distinction between 
holding and dictum—and its importance.” Leval, supra note 1, at 1282. He adds that 
the distinction “is not something to be discussed only in a brief, first-year intro-to-law 
lecture. Students who graduate without a grasp of it are not well trained for the 
profession.” Id.  
 107  See, e.g., Gerald Lebovitz et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 239, 278 (2008). 
 108  Steven A. Reisler, Teaching the Commons, 65 GUILD PRAC. 19, 20 (2008). 
 109 This is especially true at the trial court level, where judges routinely decide 
issues without the benefit of law clerks or an extensive court staff. Although trial court 
opinions are less problematic, as they are not binding on future courts, they are 
perhaps some of the biggest contributors to lawyer confusion. These are the rulings 
lawyers may see most often, and the sheer number of trial court rulings provides them 
with ample power to influence the practicing bar. 
  At the appellate level, the judge’s clerks will research the issue, but they 
may be no clearer on the holding/dicta distinction than the lawyers who filed the briefs. 
Our adversarial system suggests the lawyer potentially harmed by a failure to 
distinguish holding from dicta should point that out to the court, and in cases where 
the stakes are high enough and the resources are sufficient, that might happen. But if 
the lawyers have not focused on or are not clear about the distinction, it is unlikely 
they will aid the court in making that determination.  
 110 The chicken and egg problem is also present here; it does not matter 
whether the confusion starts with scholars (who influence law school teaching), 
lawyers, or judges. As long as there is confusion with any group, it is bound to affect 
the others. 
  This concept is loosely related to the principle of “progressive distortion” 
that Justice Frankfurter described when lamenting the elevation of dictum to holding: 
“These decisions do not justify today’s decision. They merely prove how a hint becomes 
a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision.” United 
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Judges are confused by lawyers’ arguments characterizing 
holding as dicta and vice versa. Similarly, lawyers are confused 
by court opinions that fail to delineate the distinction, as well 
as by courts’ treatment of dicta as holding (or holding as 
dicta).111 This recursive cycle is difficult to break.  
But it might not all be confusion; after all, a lawyer’s job 
is to advocate for her client.112 There is incentive to think of the 
law in amorphous terms. Most of what lawyers do is to 
persuasively argue that prior decisions should be read broadly 
(or narrowly)—and that invites arguments that the point from 
an earlier case is non-binding dicta (rather than binding 
holding) or is binding holding (rather than only potentially 
persuasive dicta).113 Furthermore, judges may prefer to create 
rules even when the case before them does not directly require 
them to decide the issue.114 But whether accidental or 
intentional, the combination of actors and their reliance on 
each other creates a ripple effect that is difficult to break. 
B. Emulating the Supreme Court  
The United States Supreme Court occupies a unique 
position in our legal system. In direct contrast to the theories of 
judicial restraint that underlie stare decisis,115 many advocate 
  
States v. Rabinowicz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753, 760 (1969). 
 111 And ironically, the problem may be further compounded by scholars 
attempting to clarify the distinction. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 442. 
 112 Id. As Greenwalt notes,  
[S]imple dichotomies such as holding-dictum and overruling-distinguishing 
do not adequately capture our complex practices. Lawyers who want to use 
concepts in a way that will persuade may not need to worry too much about 
these subtleties, but for scholars who seek to illuminate what the practices 
are really like finding an appropriate terminology is difficult. 
Id. 
 113 This ripple effect also plays into the third cause of confusion, that of 
overreliance on words and quotations. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 1, at 1256. Lawyers 
and judges routinely drop quotations into their briefs and opinions, often without 
explanatory parentheticals or any other means of providing context for the reader. 
Without understanding the facts, issue, and holding of the prior case, it is difficult to 
understand how the quotation should apply to the case at bar. Yet lawyers and judges 
appear to follow this tactic on at least a somewhat regular basis. 
 114 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 1126, 1136 (Ill. 2003) (“[T]oday’s 
dicta should become tomorrow’s ruling.”). 
 115 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the force 
and necessity of stare decisis, but because of its special position in making policy, the 
Court has also found occasion to overrule their prior decisions. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (stating that “stare decisis is essential to the respect 
accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,” yet overruling 
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that the Supreme Court is not only able to act without 
restraint,116 but sometimes obligated to do so.117 The Supreme 
Court is also not generally considered an “error-correcting” 
court, as the courts of appeals are.118 Rather, its function is to 
decide cases that “involve[] principles, the application of which 
are of wide public or governmental interest, and which should 
be authoritatively declared by the final court.”119 
  
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251-53 
(1998) (overruling House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945)); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 827-30 (1991) (stating that stare decisis is “the preferred course because it 
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process,” yet overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) 
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)).  
  Lower courts are generally more constrained. See, e.g., Tate v. Showboat 
Marina Casino P’ship, 431 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 2005). In Tate, Judge Posner argued 
that stare decisis “imparts authority to a decision . . . merely by virtue of the authority 
of the rendering court and independently of the quality of its reasoning. The essence of 
stare decisis is that the mere existence of certain decisions becomes a reason for 
adhering to their holdings in subsequent cases.” Id. at 583 (citations omitted). The 
“adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception.” BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921). But it arguably ought to 
also “be in some degree relaxed.” Id. at 150.  
 116 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial 
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005). Siegel 
discredits the theory that the United States Supreme Court follows a “minimalist” 
approach, deciding cases on “the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to 
them.” Id. at 1963. 
 117 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1069 (debunking the analogy 
between Supreme Court Justices and baseball umpires, noting that although “both 
make decisions, it is hard to think of a less apt analogy. An umpire applies rules 
created by others; the Supreme Court, through its decisions, creates rules that others 
play by”); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing the “Court should therefore make the most of the cases it 
does hear by issuing broad decisions that govern a wide range of cases in the lower 
courts”); Siegel, supra note 116, at 2015 (“[O]ften the Justices have a duty to resolve 
important constitutional questions, especially those implicating the fundamental rights 
of individuals. This obligation is more important than the rule-of-law values of 
stability, consistency, predictability, and (I would add) sincerity.”) (citations omitted). 
Siegel describes this obligation as an “essential part of the Supreme Court’s role—and 
comparative advantage—in our constitutional system of separate but interrelated 
powers.” Id. Further, as compared to Congress and the President, and to the states, 
“the Justices are more insulated from the pressures of majoritarian politics and 
therefore better equipped to protect minority rights.” Id. 
 118 Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View 
From the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court does not generally determine whether the lower courts have correctly disposed of 
a particular case. . . . Rather than correcting errors, then, the Supreme Court is 
charged with providing a uniform rule of federal law in areas that require one.”); see 
also infra note 119. 
 119 William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act 
of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1925) (arguing the Court should hear cases 
challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes, raising individual liberties, 
interpreting federal statutes if of wide enough magnitude, questions regarding federal 
jurisdiction, and circuit split cases effecting large numbers of people). But see Paul D. 
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In addition to this exclusive constitutional position, the 
Court’s current practice is vastly different from that in any 
other court.120 The Supreme Court now hears only 
approximately eighty cases a year.121 This gives the Court an 
incentive to reach broadly with each decision; and, because 
they are so long, Supreme Court opinions simply have more 
space to include dicta.122 Supreme Court cases are generally 
more complex and take longer to resolve than other courts’ 
cases,123 but each Justice typically authors only nine majority 
opinions.124 Comparatively, appellate court judges author 
  
Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the 
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 594 (2009) (“Excessive 
independence for Justices in a position of lawmaking is taken by many as an offense 
against the traditions of democratic self-government.”). Carrington and Cramton add: 
“The Supreme Court of the United States has in the last century largely forsaken 
responsibility for the homely task of deciding cases in accord with preexisting law and 
has settled into the role of a superlegislature devoted to making new law to govern 
future events.” Id. at 587. 
 120 Breyer, supra note 118, at 94 (noting the United States Supreme Court is 
“similar” to state supreme courts “in that all of our cases raise significant matters of 
law,” but pointing out that the United States Supreme Court confronts “a steady diet of 
federal constitutional cases. This workload also differs from my work as a judge on a 
federal court of appeals, where we intermittently considered constitutional questions, 
but nothing approaching the broad range of constitutional questions that reaches the 
Supreme Court”); F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the 
Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 659-64 (2009) (pointing to some of the 
characteristics necessary for an effective Supreme Court, and noting some of those 
features are not essential for lower courts). But see Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, 
Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1439 (2009) (suggesting the Supreme Court should increase in size and hear cases 
in panels).  
 121 Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The 
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006); George, supra note 
120, at 1441 (noting the Court decided, with signed, written opinions, only seventy-two 
cases in 2007); Siegel, supra note 116, at 1958. This equals approximately one percent 
of the cases where certiorari petitions are filed. Id. The Court does, of course, spend 
significant time determining which cases to accept. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 
142.  
 122 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Judicial efficiency suggests 
reducing anticipated future conflicts would provide both predictability and stability. 
  In 1983, the average majority Supreme Court opinion was 4,700 words, as 
opposed to 3,100 in federal courts of appeals opinions. See infra note 149. 
 123 POSNER, supra note 2, at 142. In contrast to the fewer than a hundred 
cases per year on the Supreme Court’s docket, the federal courts of appeals handled 
almost 50,000 cases in 1995 alone. Id. at 61 tbl.3.2. 
 124 Id. at 141. The problems created by law clerks, see infra notes 142-52 and 
accompanying text, are present at the Supreme Court level as well. Each Justice has 
more law clerks than each appellate court judge, and there are more clerks per opinion 
drafted in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 141-43 (noting that 
the “length and scholarly apparatus of Supreme Court opinions” suggest the Justices 
have been transformed from draftsmen to editors).  
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substantially more opinions with substantially less 
assistance.125  
Yet despite these differences, the lower courts appear to 
be emulating the Supreme Court.126 Judge Leval connects the 
“gradual change in the self-image of courts”127 to the confusion 
between holding and dicta: “Once, the perception of the judicial 
function was relatively modest—to settle disputes under an 
existing body of rules. . . .”128 In that system, “judges were not 
seen as making law through their opinions, but rather as 
finding the common law, which existed already, waiting only to 
be discovered.”129 Over time, “and with the central role courts 
have increasingly played in resolving important social 
questions, we have come to see ourselves as something 
considerably grander—as lawgivers, teachers, fonts of wisdom, 
even keepers of the national conscience. This change of image 
has helped transform dicta from trivia into a force.”130  
C. The Emphasis on Words over Concepts 
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition that “the 
language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we 
were dealing with language of a statute,”131 lawyers and judges 
  
 125 See generally POSNER, supra note 2, at 139-43.  
 126 Because the Supreme Court is more apt to issue dicta—because the 
Justices have more time for each opinion, because their dicta has more effect than that 
of a lower court, and because their cases have a broader reach than the average case—
lower courts emulating the Supreme Court are also more apt to issue dicta. 
  Dicta by the United States Supreme Court carries more weight than dicta 
by lower courts, however. Some courts describe it as “highly persuasive” and some 
claim it generally “must be treated as authoritative.” See, e.g., Winslow v. FERC, 587 
F.3d 1133, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 
274 (3d Cir. 2007). But neither courts nor commentators seriously suggest that dicta 
from other courts, often including state supreme courts, should have any binding effect. 
See, e.g., Eady v. Morgan, 515 F.3d 587, 600 (6th Cir. 2008) (denying habeas relief 
when the defendant’s lawyer failed to raise Tennessee Supreme Court dicta, noting 
that although the lower court could be persuaded by the dicta, it was not binding law); 
Taylor, supra note 2, at 104-13. 
 127 Leval, supra note 1, at 1255. 
 128 Id.  
 129 Id. In contrast, he describes a court of appeals chastising a district court 
judge for “failing to follow its earlier dictum,” quoting the appellate court as follows: 
“[O]ur articulation [in Quinn] . . . became law of the circuit, regardless of whether it 
was in some technical sense ‘necessary’ to our disposition of the case. The [lower court 
was] . . . required to follow [it].” Id. at 1251 (alteration in original). 
 130 Id. at 1256. 
 131 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979); see also Aldisert, supra 
note 2, at 607 (indicating a court is not bound by the rationale; subsequent courts are 
bound by “what the court did, not what it said”); Goodhart, supra note 2, at 162, 179, 
182 (arguing that the reasons given for the decision and the rule articulated in the 
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increasingly rely on the words found in judicial opinions rather 
than the underlying components of those judicial decisions—
facts, issues, holdings, and outcomes.132 Yet this is almost sure 
to confuse the holding/dicta distinction, and that makes the 
promulgation of dicta a dangerous practice.133  
  
decision are not part of the holding; rather, the holding “is to be found in the conclusion 
reached by the judge on the basis of the material facts and on the exclusion of the 
immaterial ones”). 
 132 Understanding these components is essential to understanding a case’s 
holding. Leval, supra note 1, at 1269. 
 133 As the Ninth Circuit noted: “Stare decisis is the policy of the court to stand 
by precedent . . . . [T]he word ‘decisis’ . . . means, literally and legally, the decision. Nor 
is the doctrine stare dictis; it is not ‘to stand by or keep to what was said.’” In re 
Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996).  
  In spite of this clear direction, some courts seem to expressly privilege 
judicial statements—which are far more likely to be dicta—over a case’s holding. For 
example, in Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 372 (1999), 
the court correctly asserted that under principles of stare decisis, courts were not 
bound unless a prior court actually “heard and resolved” the issue. Id. at 376. The court 
went on, however, to state that “[i]n addition, a case will not be treated as binding 
precedent on a point of law where the holding is only implicit or assumed in the 
decision but is not announced.” Id. The court cited a 1952 United States Supreme 
Court case in support of this proposition, yet what that Court actually said was: “The 
effect of the omission was not there raised in briefs or argument nor discussed in the 
opinion of the Court. Therefore, the case is not a binding precedent on this point.” 
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).  
  The “announce” requirement created by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. 
emphasizes words—statements and articulations—suggesting that a holding is a 
holding only if the court states it clearly and labels it as such. But courts at times 
overstate their holding. They also, at times, fail to state their holding, even when they 
in fact do reach a holding, as is evident from the result or the rationale. More 
significantly, should courts have the power to declare the extent of their holdings? Or 
to avoid stare decisis and the binding nature of precedent by simply refusing to clearly 
state their holdings? 
  The Rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio have also struggled with this 
issue. Prior to 2002, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions 
stated that the syllabus of an Ohio Supreme Court decision—not the opinion itself—
stated the “controlling points of law.” The rule was amended effective May 1, 2002, and 
this was the committee’s stated rationale:  
[T]he Supreme Court’s historic “syllabus rule” may have outlived its 
usefulness. Over the last decade, there appears to have been declining use of 
the “syllabus” by some members of the Court, and one frequently finds much 
“good law” in an opinion—including even footnotes—which is never reflected 
in any syllabus paragraphs. If there is “disharmony” between the syllabus 
and the text, the syllabus would control. 
The current rule still focuses on “statements” of the law, but expands review 
beyond the syllabus:  
(B)(1) The law stated in a Supreme Court opinion is contained within its 
syllabus (if one is provided), and its text, including footnotes.  
(2) If there is disharmony between the syllabus of an opinion and its text or 
footnotes, the syllabus controls. 
OHIO SUP. CT. R. FOR THE REPORTING OF OPINIONS R. 1 (2002), available at http://www. 
supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/reporting/Report.pdf. 
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This emphasis on words rather than concepts has arisen 
for a number of interrelated reasons. First, the changing 
nature of judicial opinion writing enforces this emphasis. The 
substantial increase in judicial caseloads,134 combined with the 
increased reliance on law clerks,135 suggests that a thorough 
review of all the potentially relevant law is simply unlikely to 
occur in most cases.  
Second, the changing nature of legal research also 
encourages overreliance on words and quotations. Most legal 
researchers now conduct their research electronically,136 where 
they can search for words rather than subjects, concepts, or 
legal principles. Using full-text word searching, they can now 
copy and paste quotations directly into their documents with 
remarkable ease.137  
Third, changes to the citation rules over the past 
twenty-five years have resulted in a current emphasis on 
statements—words, phrases, and quotations—at the expense of 
holdings. This emphasis on statements favors quotations and 
paraphrased passages, and also makes it more difficult to 
discern the actual holding of a case cited in a brief or an 
opinion.  
Finally, changes to our society over the past thirty years 
are undoubtedly involved as well. We have become a “sound 
  
 134 POSNER, supra note 2, at 62 fig.3.1 (showing federal appeals courts’ cases 
per year increased from less than 50,000 cases in 1904 to approximately 100,000 cases 
in 1967 to almost 300,000 cases in 1995). 
 135 The Supreme Court began hiring law clerks in the 1930s; they increased to 
two clerks per Justice in 1947, three clerks per Justice in 1970, and four clerks per 
Justice in 1978. Id. at 139. The federal appellate courts also began hiring law clerks in 
the 1930s; they increased to two per judge in 1970 and three per judge in 1980. Id. 
There is also reason to believe that the increased use of law clerks has resulted in an 
increase in the number of precedents cited in each opinion, Frank B. Cross et al., 
Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and 
Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 535 (2010), as well as an increase in opinion 
length. POSNER, supra note 2, at 155 (noting a “large increase in the length of the 
Supreme Court’s majority opinions” between 1969 and 1972, when the Justices “each 
became entitled to a third law clerk”). 
 136 5 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: ONLINE 
RESEARCH (2009) v-xiii [hereinafter ABA SURVEY REPORT] (reporting that 97% of 
private practice lawyers surveyed by the ABA conduct online legal research, which 
increased from 91% two years earlier). Only 51% of the respondents reported 
researching in print materials regularly, as opposed to 58% in 2006. Id. at v-xi. All of 
the lawyers under the age of forty reported conducting online research, and 92% of the 
lawyers over the age of sixty did as well. Id. at v-xiii. This trend is likely to continue. 
Daniel T. Willingham, Have Technology and Multitasking Rewired How Students 
Learn?, 34 AM. EDUC. 23, 23 (2010) (“[T]he average American between the ages of 8 
and 18 spends more than 7.5 hours per day using a phone, computer, television, or 
other electronic device.”). 
 137 See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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bite society,” characterized by short attention spans and 
multitasking.138 It is hardly surprising that in this 
environment, a short quotation is often preferable to a lengthy 
discussion of a case’s facts, issues, and holding.  
1. The Changing Nature of Judicial Opinion Writing 
Many have commented on the exponential increase in 
courts’ caseloads.139 With more opinions to write each year, less 
time can be devoted to each opinion.140 Most significantly, each 
judge has proportionately less time than in the past to spend 
drafting and redrafting each opinion.141 The solution to this 
problem has largely been to delegate the initial opinion 
drafting to law clerks.142 Although once the province of the 
  
 138 JEFFREY SCHEUER, THE SOUND BITE SOCIETY: TELEVISION AND THE 
AMERICAN MIND 3 (1999) (arguing America’s sound bite culture has “impoverish[ed] 
political debate”). Scheuer defines a sound bite society, such as the United States, as 
“one that is flooded with images and slogans, bits of information and abbreviated or 
symbolic messages—a culture of instant but shallow communication.” Id. at 8. Sound 
bite societies are “indifferent to . . . serious discourse.” Id. Scheuer also points out that 
within a sound bite society the “electronic culture fragments information into isolated, 
dramatic particles and resists longer and more complex messages,” which interferes 
with abstraction and recognizing ambiguity. Id. at 9. 
 139 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 132 (“There were 66 circuit judgeships 
in 1960; there are 167 today [1985]; there would be 886 if the number of judgeships 
were increased to the point necessary to maintain the same ratio of judgeships to cases 
as in 1960 (1:57).”); Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2009); Harry T. Edwards, A Judge’s View on Justice, 
Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 259, 262 (1981); Richard A. Posner, 
Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and 
Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761-62 (1983) (noting 
that federal appeals increased by 400% between 1960 and 1981); see also generally 
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996).  
 140 POSNER, supra note 2, at 141 (“The biggest ‘give’ is in the time the judge 
devotes to the actual preparation of his opinions.”); Leval, supra note 1, at 1256. This is 
true even with the growing number of “unpublished” opinions being released by the 
courts of appeals each year. Aldisert et al., supra note 139, at 6-9; Richman, supra note 
139, at 275, 281-86.  
 141 Judge Leval terms this “insufficient judicial scrutiny.” Leval, supra note 1, 
at 1262. He notes that “assertions made in dictum are less likely to receive careful 
scrutiny, both in the writing chambers and in the concurring chambers. When a panel 
of judges confers . . . [they] generally focus on the outcome and on the reasoning upon 
which the outcome depends. Judges work under great time pressure.” Furthermore, 
when the “concurring chambers receive the writing judge’s draft for their review, they 
are likely to look primarily at whether the opinion fulfills their expectations as to the 
judgment and the reasoning given in support. There is a high likelihood that 
peripheral observations, alternative explanations, and dicta will receive scant 
attention.” Id. 
 142 This solution has also been discussed at length. See, e.g., POSNER, supra 
note 2, at 139-59; Richman, supra note 139, at 288 (“It is widely assumed in the legal 
world that law clerks draft most opinions. There may be some debate about how 
widespread the phenomenon is, but there is agreement that it occurs to a significant 
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judge, law clerks now play a major role in creating the written 
work product generated by courts.143 And it is this written work 
product that has precedential value. True, judges still direct 
the outcome.144 But they seldom create the first draft of their 
opinions.145  
As understandable as the reliance on law clerks is, it 
confuses the holding/dicta distinction even further. First, law 
clerks tend to be relatively recent law school graduates.146 Not 
only as compared to judges, but also as compared to more 
seasoned lawyers, they are less likely to be confident in their 
understanding of the law and more fearful of misstating the 
law.147 This makes them more likely to quote from existing 
precedent, which is much easier to do than to accurately 
determine a case’s holding. As Judge Posner noted, law clerks 
“feel naked unless they are quoting and citing cases and other 
authorities.”148 
  
extent with a large number of judges.”); Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And 
Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (1995) (referring to law clerks as 
judges’ “ghostwriters”); Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 
448, 455-56 (1976) (describing law clerks as “para-judges” and commenting that they 
are “not merely running citations in Shepard’s and shelving the judge’s law books”). 
 143 POSNER, supra note 2, at 140, 151 (commenting that judges “did their own 
research and writing before the workload pressures became overwhelming”).  
 144 See generally Posner, supra note 139. 
 145 Judge Posner notes the risk that judicial opinions will lose legitimacy as it 
becomes “more apparent that an opinion is the work of the law clerk” as opposed to the 
judge. POSNER, supra note 2, at 149. “This will reduce the authority of judicial 
decisions as a source of legal guidance and will increase uncertainty and with it 
litigation.” Id.; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. Furthermore, he notes 
the effect that initial draft has on the final product: “the initial draftsman of a judicial 
opinion, as of any document, is likely to have a big impact on the final product, despite 
conscientious attention by the judge to his editorial responsibility.” Posner, supra note 
139, at 772. 
  Judge Wald acknowledges the criticism judicial clerks have garnered, but 
also opines that law clerks ultimately improve, rather than reduce, the overall quality 
of judicial opinions. Wald, supra note 2, at 1384. 
 146 Christopher Avery et al., The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 805 (2001); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents? What Lazarus’s 
Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 194 (2000) (discussing the Court’s praise for “the 
use of recent law graduates as a way of bringing the latest legal thinking to sitting 
judges”); Richman, supra note 139, at 289. Recent law school graduates are also more 
likely to conduct electronic word searches than the judges who employ them. See 
generally Scott Stolley, Shortcomings of Technology: The Corruption of Legal Research, 
46 FOR THE DEF. 39, 40 (2004). 
 147 Posner, supra note 139, at 771 (“[L]aw clerks are inevitably timid 
jurists. . . . Hence, the heavy reliance . . . on quotations (too often wrenched out of 
context) from prior opinions . . . .”). Determining the holding in opinions like these is 
not easy; “[t]o pare down such an opinion in search of the hard analytical core is too 
often like peeling an onion.” Id.  
 148 POSNER, supra note 2, at 148.  
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Law clerks also draft longer opinions.149 Longer opinions 
mean the writer includes more, and that “more” is often dicta.150 
In the process, generally sound and familiar writing advice 
such as, “go easy on quotations,” is regularly ignored by judges 
and especially by law clerks.151 Consequently, the proliferation 
of longer opinions coupled with the trend toward relying more 
extensively on quotations has become a “substitute for 
thought”152—and without rigorous thought, the holding/dicta 
distinction is destined to remain obscure.  
2.  The Changing Nature of Legal Research  
Young lawyers and most law students spend day after 
day in “Google-search” mode—looking for answers to their 
questions by typing a word or short phrase into a search box 
  
 149 Posner, supra note 139, at 770-71 (“[T]he law clerk does not know what he 
can leave out. . . . [H]e tends naturally to err on the side of overinclusion.”). The 
progressively expanding judicial opinions parallel the rise in reliance on law clerks. See 
supra note 135 and accompanying text. The average number of words in federal 
appellate decisions increased by over 40% between 1960 and 1983, POSNER, supra note 
2, at 77 tbl.3.8, 153, which coincided with the increase in reliance on judicial clerks. Id. 
at 155. In 1960, for example, the average federal court of appeals opinion was 2,300 
words; by 1983, it was 3,100 words. Id. at 153, tbl.5.2. An even more significant 
increase occurred in majority opinions by the Supreme Court. In 1960, the average 
Supreme Court majority opinion was 2,000 words; by 1983, the average had ballooned 
to 4,700 words. Id.  
 150 Leval, supra note 1, at 1256 (accepting “dictum as if it were binding law” 
results “in some part from time pressures on an overworked judiciary [and] the ever-
increasing length of judicial opinions, . . . which contribute to our taking previously 
uttered statements out of context, without a careful reading to ascertain the role they 
played in the opinion”). 
 151 Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 142, at 1423-24. Judge Posner 
contrasts the “pure” and “impure” judicial writing styles, noting that the “pure” style 
“quotes heavily from previous judicial opinions” and “conceals the author’s personality.” 
Id. at 1429. More current opinions follow this pattern. “Impure” stylists, on the other 
hand, such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “like to pretend that what they are doing 
when they write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical audience of 
laypersons why the case is being decided in the way that it is. These judges eschew the 
‘professionalizing’ devices of the purist writer” including jargon, impersonality, 
excessive details, “truisms, the unembarrassed repetition of obvious propositions, [and] 
the long quotations from previous cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent.” Id. at 
1430 (citations omitted).  
 152 Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 142, at 1447.  
We tend to think that words enable thought. But words can also substitute 
for thought. The pure style [which relies heavily on quotations from prior 
opinions] is an anodyne for thought. The impure style forces—well, invites—
the writer to dig below the verbal surface of the doctrines that he is 
interpreting and applying. . . . If the judge is lucky, he may find, when he digs 
beneath the verbal surface of legal doctrine, the deep springs of the law.  
Id. 
2010] WHY DICTA BECOMES HOLDING 251 
and performing an electronic search at the speed of light.153 
Many law firms no longer have a “library”—the libraries exist 
on each lawyer’s desk in the form of a computer with an 
internet connection.154  
Perhaps the most significant contribution electronic 
legal research has made is allowing greater flexibility than was 
possible with existing print sources. Print digests have 
inherent limitations;155 electronic research provides more 
  
 153 See, e.g., Robert Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research 
Universe: The Imperative of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 31 (1994) 
(positing in 1994 that the “typical law student of today is not a product of the culture of 
the book and is just as likely to use an electronic source as a print source”); Linda 
Green Pierce, X Lawyers Mark New Spot: Understanding the Post-Baby Boomer 
Attorney, 61 OR. ST. B.J. 33, 33-34 (2001).  
  In terms of electronic legal research, Lexis, with full-text search 
capabilities, was introduced in 1973, and Westlaw followed suit in 1975. William R. 
Mills, The Decline and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm: Trustworthiness of Case 
Reports in the Digital Age, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 917, 923 (2009). Westlaw’s initial 
searching was limited to headnotes, but by 1978, Westlaw also offered full-text 
searching. John Doyle, WESTLAW and the American Digest Classification Scheme, 84 
LAW LIBR. J. 229, 229-30 (1992). Over the next twenty years, electronic legal research 
slowly increased, but when the internet became widely available and popular, “legal 
publishers moved many of their products to this medium.” Carol A. Roehrenbeck, 
Preparing Lawyers for Practice in the New Millennium, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 995 
(1999). “By the 1990s, computers and databases had become as much a part of the 
resources of the library as books.” Id. at 996.  
 154 ABA SURVEY REPORT, supra note 136, at v-x (noting that only 17% of 
private practice lawyers regularly conduct research in firm or public libraries; in 
contrast, 81% regularly conduct research in their offices, and 29% regularly conduct 
research at home). The transition from print to electronic sources does create some 
challenges. See, e.g., Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal 
Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 190 (1997) (describing, in 
1997, the “series of problems” and “range of challenges” that transforming legal 
information from books to electronic media will create). Yet the advent of electronic 
legal research has brought many advantages. First, in terms of cost, Lexis and 
Westlaw have, in some sense, leveled the playing field. Small firms can now compete 
with larger firms, as they do not have to purchase and house a large physical library. 
The advent of free and low-cost internet search options has also provided benefits; for 
example, public service offices can now minimize expenses and provide more services to 
the needy. And for those unable to visit a bricks and mortar law library, the electronic 
availability of many legal sources, especially those available for free, has increased 
access to the law.  
 155 Daniel Dabney argues that West’s Key Number System, and hence the 
digest, “influences the law itself.” Daniel Dabney, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: 
Literary Warrant and West’s Key Number System, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 229, 230 (2007). He 
labels the phenomenon created by West as the “universe of unthinkable thoughts.” Id. 
at 229-30. “If an idea doesn’t correspond to something in the Key Number System, it 
becomes an unthinkable thought.” Id. at 236. The argument is that the classification 
system necessarily limits the ways the classifier can think about the law, and hence, 
limits the law itself from evolving and expressing new ideas. See, e.g., Berring, supra 
note 153, at 30; Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: 
Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
207, 208-09 (1989) (grouping the West Digest system with the Index to Legal 
Periodicals and the Library of Congress’ subject heading system). Even John West, 
creator of the West Digest system, agreed that a “rigid” digest system would be 
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control and greater ability to customize searches. Lawyers can 
decide for themselves how to search for the information that 
may be most helpful.156  
But Google-search mode also brings potentially bad 
research habits.157 Rather than exhaustively researching an 
issue and reading everything available on a particular topic, we 
can find a good source—often boiling down to a few key quotes, 
and maybe a handful of useful cases or a summary that 
appears helpful.158 In other contexts, this may be just fine; 
when looking for the phone number for a restaurant, as long as 
we find the number, we do not care if other sites report a 
different number. But understanding the breadth of precedent 
relevant to a particular legal issue is critical. Likewise, 
understanding the holdings of the controlling case law—not 
just finding a few choice quotations from a few key cases159—is 
essential to legal analysis.  
  
ineffective, and admitted that the “classification of today will be as inadequate in the 
future as the classification of the past is at this time.” John B. West, Multiplicity of 
Reports, 2 LAW LIBR. J. 4, 7 (1909) (commenting, in 1909, on the myriad of problems 
created by the “multiplicity of reports” that result from the increasing number of courts 
and decisions). 
 156 Berring, supra note 153, at 31 (recognizing that electronic word searching allows 
researchers to break free of “the constraints of the West digesting system”); Mills, supra note 
153, at 928 (“Legal researchers rejoiced over the new full-text search and retrieval systems 
that liberated them from the strictures of the Key Number digest system.”). 
 157 In addition to the problem of overemphasizing words and quotations over 
concepts, the lack of “transparency of search protocols” is a “major problem.” Berring, 
supra note 154, at 209. As Professor Berring asks, “Are electronic database users 
aware of the preemptive decisions being made for them by the system that they are 
using?” Id. He adds that lawyers are “no more likely to read directions than anyone 
else, and the industry standard for how much training and special skill acquisition one 
is willing to undergo seems to be dropping.” Id. Perhaps because electronic word 
searching in the legal research context is so similar to internet searching, law students 
and lawyers feel less of a need to attend training and simply assume they are 
competent electronic researchers.  
 158 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 2, at 140-41. 
 159 Fowler describes this phenomenon:  
When you plug in the key words or phrases to do your Boolean search . . . you 
immediately get all the cases that satisfy your query. And you are taken 
directly to the part of the opinion where your key words or phrases are found. 
If, there on your computer screen, is a sentence that says what you want it to 
say, you may conclude your research is done. You may choose not to read the 
rest of the case to find out the specific issues that were the subject of the 
appeal. You may also choose not to look carefully at the remaining results of 
your research—even though those results may reveal a line of on-point 
precedents overlooked by the first case you found. 
Id. at 141. Many electronic sources of legal information do not have full-text searching, 
so this problem is minimized. But the advantages of those sources are fewer as well. 
Mills, supra note 153, at 930. 
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Scholars have noted that electronic legal research 
encourages a focus on individual screens and snippets of text 
rather than documents as a whole; this devalues the 
significance of legal principles in favor of facts and rules taken 
out of context.160 Electronic research combined with word 
processing allows writers to copy and paste language into briefs 
and judicial opinions with ease,161 but without necessarily 
considering the context for that statement. This may result in 
more “tilting at windmills”—lawyers putting forward “marginal 
cases, theories, and arguments.”162  
This is not to suggest that electronic word searching is 
useless; on the contrary, it is a valuable addition to the 
available research tools.163 But electronic word searching164 
emphasizes, by its very nature, particular words over 
concepts.165 As noted by one commentator, a judge’s particular 
  
 160 Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A 
Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 297-98 (2001); Molly Warner Lien, 
Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 88-90 
(1998) (equating society’s “sound-bite” culture with law students’ and lawyers’ “‘law-
byte’ reasoning and hypertext analysis” and criticizing the “rapid rule extraction” 
electronic research facilitates). 
 161 Bast, supra note 160, at 298. 
 162 Katrina Fisher Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 223, 226 (2008). 
 163 In terms of the research strategies and research tools used by lawyers, 
legal researchers “tend to use more than one system, and often use several.” Schanck, 
supra note 48, at 17. Some lawyers never use digests, id. at 18, and lawyers tend to 
focus more on facts “than on abstract doctrines.” Id. Approximately 10% of all Westlaw 
searches are Key Number (the online digest) searches. E-mail from Daniel Dabney, 
Senior Director of Classification, ThomsonReuters, to Judith M. Stinson, Clinical 
Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University 
(Feb. 12, 2010, 02:15 MST) (on file with author).  
 164 Electronic searches are generally either Boolean searches or Natural 
Language searches. When conducting a Boolean search, the researcher essentially 
creates his or her own indexing system. Berring, supra note 153, at 30. But Boolean 
searching is inherently based on the particular words used by judges; furthermore, 
Berring notes that researchers are not likely “adept at Boolean searching.” Id. 
  Natural Language searching uses “algorithms to retrieve cases that [are] 
statistically likely to be relevant, based on the words entered in search statements 
devised by the researcher.” Mills, supra note 153, at 920. Mills notes that “[n]atural 
language search[es] proved even more popular than Boolean search[es]”—likely 
because of the similarity between a Natural Language search and Google or other basic 
internet searching. Id. The searcher does not have to think about the relationship 
between terms; he simply lets the computer default system decide those matters. For 
this reason, Natural Language searches are generally less effective and less efficient 
than Boolean searches. 
 165 “The efficiency of word-based searches depends on the probability that the 
searcher and the court have used the same word or phrase for the concept in question.” 
Delgado, supra note 155, at 220-21. Because the computer, when running a Boolean or 
Natural Language search, is looking for the specific words entered by the user, 
language becomes key. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 153, at 921. Concepts that can be 
expressed in more than one way—as many legal concepts can—are not best suited to 
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statement of the law is “mere dictum.”166 Judges are “not bound 
by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge 
even in the controlling case.”167 Case law is contrasted with 
statutes for this purpose: “What a court says is dictum, but 
what a legislature says is a statute.”168 
As noted by one scholar, “[w]hile online full-text 
retrieval was developed to free searchers from the limitations 
of editorially indexed cases, it also minimized the assistance to 
be gained from editorial judgment.”169 Furthermore, word 
searches, without reading the entire opinion in which a 
sentence appears, do not reveal whether the statement reflects 
the court’s holding or is merely dictum.170  
At least one commentator has suggested that electronic 
legal research has “devalued the holding/dictum distinction.”171 
  
word searches. Even with concepts usually expressed in a phrase, word searching may 
miss key relevant authorities. For example, if a researcher looks for “parol evidence 
rule” but the court terms the rule “the rule on parole evidence,” the researcher may not 
find the source. True, a carefully crafted search is more likely to capture alternative 
phrasings for the same concept. But sometimes judges do not use the words one might 
most expect to be used. 
  “[T]he computer is ill-suited for finding concepts. It is great for finding 
discrete words or specific cases, but that’s just data collection. . . . Law is concept-
oriented, and concepts are best found in sources that are categorized by concept, such 
as digests.” Stolley, supra note 146, at 40. 
 166 LEVI, supra note 46, at 2. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 6. 
 169 Doyle, supra note 153, at 230. 
 170 Fowler, supra note 2, at 141. Although easy, the attraction to quotes is 
puzzling. Quotes are like statistics; you can find one to say anything you want. I am 
reminded of the student who returned from his summer clerkship experience with a 
large law firm. When I asked whether his research skills were up to par with his 
colleagues, he advised me that his most frequent research project was of this sort: “find 
me a case that says X.” When the goal is to find cases that say X, rather than hold X, it 
is easy to see why word searching is so popular.  
 171 Id. at 140-41.  
  More significantly, changes in 2010 to Westlaw and LexisNexis will make 
those platforms resemble, to a much greater degree, Google. Those new platforms, 
WestlawNext and Next Lexis, emphasize Natural Language searching. Jill Schachner 
Chanen, Exclusive: Inside the New Westlaw, Lexis & Bloomberg Platforms, ABA J. LAW 
NEWS NOW, Jan. 24, 2010, available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
exclusive_inside_the_new_westlaw_lexis_bloomberg_platforms. These new platforms 
will bring a number of improvements, and may help decrease, at least somewhat, the 
problems inherent in word searching; for example, WestlawNext relies on an algorithm 
that adds “synonyms, . . . terms of art, generic names, and legal relationship terms—so 
your search terms don’t have to match the judge’s terms verbatim.” THOMSON 
REUTERS, THE WESTLAW NEXT CASELAW 22-STEP EDITORIAL PROCESS 1 (2010). In 
addition, it uses the key number system—the foundation for digests—and 
automatically analyzes search patterns on your issue. THOMSON REUTERS, 
CONFIDENCE. EFFICIENCY. PRODUCTIVITY. 1 (2010).  
  But the “hunt for a good quotation” made easier by electronic word 
searching may persist, and the recent releases of Google Scholar and Bloomberg Law, 
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In addition, Judge Leval notes that the “acceptance of prior 
dictum as if it were binding law” comes, in part, from the 
“precision-guided weaponry of computer research,” which 
contributes to “our taking previously uttered statements out of 
context, without a careful reading to ascertain the role they 
played in the opinion.”172  
3. Changes to Citation Rules  
Even our dominant citation rules emphasize the words 
in judicial opinions over case holdings. In theory, lawyers and 
judges must indicate when they cite a case for anything other 
than the case’s holding.173 Yet in practice, the citation rules as 
currently framed suggest that a case’s holding is less 
significant than the statements made by the same court—even 
though statements can be and often are dicta.174 
  
and the increase of sites such as FastCase.com and TheLaw.net make clear that word 
searching is the dominant mode of conducting research. Id.; see also About Google 
Scholar, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2010) (“Google Scholar provides a simple way to broadly search for . . . 
court opinions.”); BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com (last visited Sept. 
10, 2010) (“It’s the first and only real-time research system for the 21st century legal 
practice.”); FASTCASE, http://www.fastcase.com/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (“Fastcase 
is a next-generation, Web-based legal research service, that puts the complete national 
law library on your desktop anywhere you have Internet access. Fastcase’s smarter 
searching, sorting, and visualization tools help you find the best answers fast—and 
help you find documents you might have otherwise missed.”); THELAW, 
http://www.thelaw.net/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (“Case Law: Searchable, Citable, 
Checkable & Affordable”). 
 172 Leval, supra note 1, at 1256. He also notes that that it is “easier to have 
the magic carpet of computer research whisk you straight to the pertinent sentence of 
the prior opinion and write ‘In such and such case, the court held . . . .’” Id. at 1269 
(alteration in original). 
 173 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.6.1(a), at 91 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). That rule states: “When a case 
is cited for a proposition that is not the single, clear holding of a majority of the court 
(e.g., alternative holding; by implication; dictum; dissenting opinion; plurality opinion; 
holding unclear), indicate that fact parenthetically.” Id. (emphasis added). 
  However, a writer may fail to identify when a case is cited for other than its 
holding—perhaps in a deliberate attempt to mislead, but perhaps because the writer 
herself is not clear about whether the proposition is the case’s holding or simply dicta. 
 174 The problem likely stems from the fact that The Bluebook was designed for 
scholarly, not practical, writing. The Bluebook is “[c]ompiled by the editors of the 
Columbia Law Review, the Harvard Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, and the Yale Law Journal.” THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 173, at iii. Those 
editors edit scholarly articles, not practitioners’ documents.  
  Academics and students writing scholarly papers generally focus in more 
depth on secondary sources than on cases. And for secondary sources, as well as the 
three other common types of primary authority—constitutions, statutes, and 
administrative regulations—the actual language used is controlling. The reader needs 
to see the exact language used by the legislature, for example, and wants either the 
words or a paraphrased summary of a scholarly author’s argument. But this same 
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The current problem lies in the rules regarding 
signals,175 but this has not always been the case. In fact, 
previous versions of the signal rule—which one would think 
instinctually tells a reader when a cited source is not directly 
on point—did not elevate statements over holdings. The 
original Bluebook, in 1926, stated the following: “To indicate 
the purpose of the citation, use the following forms: (a) For a 
square holding, cite the case only at the page where it 
begins.”176 The next subsection addressed dicta: “For a dictum, 
put ‘see’ before the name of the case, and, after the initial page 
of the case, put a comma and the page where the dictum 
begins.”177 Early signal rules therefore emphasized judicial 
“holdings” and not simply judicial “statements.”178  
  
reliance on language should not necessarily hold true with judicial opinions. The words 
used by a court are often of little significance; instead, the court’s holding—which 
generally requires more complex legal analysis to determine—is of prime significance, 
as it is the only binding component of the opinion. See id. at 91; see also supra text 
accompanying note 159. Yet the signal rules in The Bluebook make no distinction 
between cases and other authorities. 
 175 Although perhaps a subtle distinction, to the extent that some writers are 
well versed in the current citation rules—and law clerks, having been recent law 
review editors, are bound to be—these rules at least subconsciously tell writers what is 
more highly valued and what is less valued in terms of authority. See supra note 146 
and accompanying text. It is true that citation rules likely have little effect on most 
judges. Richard A. Posner, Law Reviews, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 158 (2006). But many 
lawyers, and likely a majority of law clerks, do pay attention to these rules. 
 176 A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION: ABBREVIATIONS AND FORM OF CITATION 
R. I(A)(3)(a), at 1 (1st ed. 1926) (photo reprint William S. Hein & Co. 1998), available at 
http://www.legalbluebook.com/img/PastVersions/USC01.pdf. 
 177 Id. R. I(A)(3)(b), at 2. This rule changed slightly, but the focus remained on 
holdings until the thirteenth edition was published in the 1980s. For example, under 
the tenth edition of The Bluebook, no signal was necessary if the writer was  
introduc[ing] any authority which directly upholds a proposition of either law 
or fact which is stated by the text [meaning the writer’s text, not the case 
being cited]. Only authorities which unequivocally hold the stated proposition 
of law or explicitly make the statement or conclusion of law or fact which is 
made by the text should be cited as support without a signal. 
A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION: FORMS OF CITATION AND ABBREVIATIONS R. 27:2:1, at 
85 (10th ed. 1958) (emphasis added), available at http://www.legalbluebook.com/ 
img/PastVersions/USC10.pdf. Under this rule, no signal was required if either a case 
was cited for its holding or if a case was cited for an explicit statement, conclusion of 
law, or conclusion of fact. Id. 
 178 The rules in the eleventh edition were similar; no signal was required 
when the “[c]ited authority directly supports” the writer’s “statement in [the] text.” A 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION: FORMS OF CITATION AND ABBREVIATIONS R. 26:1, at 86 
(11th ed. 1967) (emphasis added), available at http://www.legalbluebook.com/img/ 
PastVersions/USC11.pdf. The twelfth edition rules were more comprehensive, but still 
recognized that when a case was cited for its holding, no signal was required. A 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 2:3(a), at 6 (12th ed. 1976), available at http://www. 
legalbluebook.com/img/PastVersions/USC12.pdf. That rule stated that no signal was 
required when the “[c]ited authority: (i) directly supports statement in text, (ii) 
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However, the rule requiring a “see” signal became more 
statement-based with the thirteenth edition. A signal was 
required unless the cited authority, “(i) state[d] the proposition; 
(ii) identifie[d] the source of a quotation; or (iii) identifie[d] an 
authority referred to in text.”179  
This emphasis on “statements” carried through 
subsequent editions of The Bluebook180 and has become even 
stronger. The fifteenth edition required no signal when the 
cited authority “clearly states the proposition.”181 This emphasis 
is not added; it is in The Bluebook’s rule. And the sixteenth 
edition eliminated the first prong relating to a “proposition” 
altogether—requiring a signal unless the cited authority 
identified the “source of a quotation” or identified “an authority 
referred to in the text.”182 Hence, The Bluebook made it clear 
that statements—not holdings, and not even propositions—
mattered for purposes of citation.  
The current rule regarding “see” once again includes 
“propositions,” but requires that a signal be provided unless the 
cited authority “directly states the proposition.”183 Following 
this rule, a signal is required, even for a holding, if it is not 
“directly stated” in the opinion.184 This seems, frankly, 
nonsensical.185  
  
identifies source of a quotation, or (iii) identifies an authority referred to in text.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 179 A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 2.2(a), at 8 (13th ed. 10th prtg. 1985) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.legalbluebook.com/img/PastVersions/USC13.pdf. 
 180 See, e.g., A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 2.2(a), at 8 (14th ed. 1986), 
available at http://www.legalbluebook.com/img/PastVersions/USC14.pdf.  
 181 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a)(i), at 22 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 15th ed. 12th prtg. 1995) (emphasis in 
original), available at http://www.legalbluebook.com/img/PastVersions/USC15.pdf. 
That rule also retained the prongs requiring no signal if the citation identified the 
source of a quotation or identified authority referred to in the text. Id. 
 182 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 22 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 16th ed. 3rd prtg. 1996). 
 183 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 54 (Columbia 
Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 1st prtg. 2010) (emphasis added). That rule also 
provides that a signal is not required if the cited authority “identifies the source of a 
quotation” or “identifies an authority referred to in the text.” Id. The comment 
contained in this rule emphasizes quotations and paraphrased information even 
further: “Use ‘[no signal],’ for example, when directly quoting an authority or when 
restating numerical data from an authority.” Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185 In contrast, citation rules under the ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & 
DARBY DICKERSON, ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION 
(4th ed. 2010) eliminate this problem. Under that citation manual, which is designed 
for practitioners rather than academics, no signal is used when the “cited authority 
directly supports the stated proposition.” Id. R. 44.2(a)(1), at 370 (emphasis added). A 
“see” signal is proper under the ALWD Citation Manual “when the cited authority (a) 
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The Bluebook’s signal rules suggest that what the courts 
say is more relevant than what they do. Regardless of the 
definition one chooses for holding, commentators agree that not 
every statement within a judicial opinion is binding.186 The 
Bluebook rule implies all holdings are clearly articulated, and 
what is articulated is a holding. Anyone who has practiced law 
for any length of time knows that neither of those propositions 
are accurate.187  
4. Societal Changes  
American society has evolved into a culture that relies 
on quick sound bites rather than deeper analysis for much of 
its information.188 Current generations are increasingly 
characterized by their short attention spans.189 As a profession, 
the legal community appears to be aware of these societal 
changes; for example, a number of lawyers and judges have 
focused on this evolution for purposes of persuading courts,190 
juries,191 and the public (through the media).192 But the legal 
  
supports the stated proposition implicitly or (b) contains dicta that support the 
proposition.” Id. R. 44.3, at 371. Hence, when a case is cited for its holding—whether 
articulated or not—no signal is used. A court’s statements are not the triggering event; 
a court’s holding is.  
 186 See supra note 26. 
 187 But see Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 372, 
376 (1999) (“[A] case will not be treated as binding precedent on a point of law where 
the holding is only implicit or assumed in the decision but is not announced.”). 
 188 Generational changes may influence these developments as well. “Baby 
boomers” are those born between 1946 and 1964. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Oldest Baby Boomers Turn 60! (Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/seniors/oldestboomers2007.htm. That generation grew up without computers, 
and many without television. Instead, baby boomers “learned technology as it was 
invented.” Pierce, supra note 153, at 33. In contrast, those born between the mid-1960s 
and the late 1970s, termed “Generation X,” “grew up with computers” and “process 
information differently. The spurts of immediate information provided by computers 
and television . . . created a generation accustomed to getting information and 
education quickly and in sound bites.” Id. This group is identified by a “short attention 
span, which may arguably limit focus,” but which also “enhances the ability to do 
multiple tasks. A range of available information through the media and computers has 
enhanced this generation’s ability to draw conclusions from readily available sources.” 
Id. “Generation Y,” also termed the “Millennial Generation,” are those born between 
1982 and 2002. Is Your Firm Ready for the Millennials?, KNOWLEDGE@EMORY (Mar. 8, 
2006), http://knowledge.emory.edu/article.cfm?articleid=950. This generation is apt to be 
risk averse, id., and this in turn may further complicate the problem of overreliance on 
quotations. 
 189 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 153, at 33. 
 190 See, e.g., Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Brevity: Adopt Abraham Lincoln’s 
Habits, 6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIR. 28 (2009); Cathy R. Silak, From the Bench: All 
the World’s a Stage, 31 LITIG. 3 (2005). 
 191 See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and Architecture of Closing 
Argument, 76 TUL. L. REV. 961, 1034 (2002). 
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community does not appear to be thinking deeply about how 
these broader societal changes might be affecting our ability to 
conduct and communicate complex legal analysis. More 
specifically, there is no discussion about the effect these 
changes may have on the fundamental distinction between 
holding and dicta. 
Society’s growing reliance on sound bites and the ever 
decreasing attention span of its members contribute to the 
inability of lawyers, judges, and law students to distinguish 
between holding and dicta.193 We refuse to engage in the deep 
thinking necessary to determine a particular case’s holding. It 
is simply easier to find and quote some appealing language, 
even when the quoted phrase has little or nothing to do with 
the court’s holding.194  
Furthermore, psychologists argue that “cognitive 
fluency”195 suggests we believe that what is easy is correct, and 
conversely, what is more difficult is likely incorrect.196 Applying 
this theory to the holding/dictum distinction, it is far easier to 
extract seemingly relevant quotations from complex judicial 
opinions than it is to read and understand their actual 
holdings. Under principles of cognitive fluency, this is not only 
the easy answer, but also normatively correct. And with a 
society predisposed to the siren song of media sound bites and 
without the attention span to read and reread lengthy opinions 
  
 192 See, e.g., Michelle DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public 
Opinion, Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009); Eric M. Van Horn & Nancy B. Rapoport, Restructuring the 
Misperception of Lawyers: Another Task for Bankruptcy Professionals, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2009, at 44 (providing a number of tips, with the first being: “Speak in 
sound bites. When was the last time you had a decent attention span?”).  
 193 See, e.g., Aldisert et al., supra note 139, at 2 (“Unfortunately, readers and 
users of judicial opinions—litigants, lawyers, other judges, clerks, researchers, and law 
students—tend to be very busy. As a result, they have highly selective reading 
habits.”). 
 194 Fajans & Falk, supra note 30, at 170. Multitasking also contributes to this 
problem; one article points to the ten point drop in functioning IQ that occurs when 
workers are distracted by e-mail and phone calls. Karen Erger, Mono-Mania: The Case 
Against Multitasking, 94 ILL. B.J. 206, 207 (2006); see also Daniel T. Willingham, Have 
Technology and Multitasking Rewired How Students Learn?, 34 AM. EDUC. 23, 25 
(2010) (“[W]hen you do two things at once, you don’t do either one as well as when you 
do them one at a time.”). 
 195 See generally Tedra Fazendeiro et al., How Dynamics of Thinking Create 
Affective and Cognitive Feelings, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 271, 271-89 (Eddie Harmon-
Jones & Piotr Winkielman eds., 2007). Cognitive fluency is “a measure of how easy it is 
to think about” a topic. Drake Bennett, Easy = True: How ‘Cognitive Fluency’ Shapes 
What We Believe, How We Invest, and Who Will Become a Supermodel, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 31, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/01/ 
31/easy_true?mode=PF. 
 196 Bennett, supra note 195. 
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to accurately determine courts’ holdings, an overreliance on 
words, phrases, and quotations inescapably compounds the 
confusion between holding and dicta.  
IV. TENTATIVE PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION 
Regardless of how one defines holding (and therefore 
dicta), it is clear that judges and lawyers routinely confuse the 
two. Most significantly, dictum is regularly elevated to holding. 
This article identifies a number of reasons underlying this 
confusion—the ripple effect, courts’ tendency to emulate the 
Supreme Court, and the overemphasis on words, especially in 
the form of quotations. While this list may not be exhaustive, 
these underlying causes of the confusion can serve as a starting 
point for articulating proposals that may stop the repeated 
conflation of holding and dicta.  
First, increasing education regarding the distinction is 
bound to help. That education could occur in law schools,197 in 
continuing legal education seminars for practicing lawyers,198 
and at judicial training conferences.199 Within law schools, 
students should be warned about the dangers of relying on the 
words and phrases they find in judicial opinions, especially 
when taken out of context.200 Although it is true that law 
students are regularly asked to identify the holding of a case, 
they are often not told whether their response is correct.201 
Further, they are rarely asked to identify dicta; without 
consciously distinguishing between the two, their 
understanding of these concepts is bound to be limited.202  
  
 197 See supra note 106. 
 198 Judy M. Cornett, The Ethics of Blawging: A Genre Analysis, 41 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 221, 245 n.155 (2009) (noting that many states require their lawyers to 
complete mandatory training each year). 
 199 For example, all judges in Arizona are required to complete “[e]ducational 
requirements,” which include “a minimum of sixteen hours of approved course work each 
year, including . . . attendance at an annual judicial conference designated by the 
supreme court.” ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. § 1-302(J)(1)(b), available at http://www. 
azcourts.gov/Portals/0/admcode/pdfcurrentcode/1-302_Amended_01-2008.pdf. By court 
rule, “[j]udicial education shall address relevant areas such as judicial competence, 
performance, case management, opinion writing, and administration,” id. § 1-302(J)(3)(a), 
and education programs for judges are “designed to impart knowledge, improve skills and 
techniques and increase the understanding of judges regarding their responsibilities and 
their impact on the judicial process, the people involved, and society.” Id. § 1-302(J)(3)(b). 
 200 See supra Part III.C. 
 201 Although the Socratic Method offers many pedagogical advantages, it does 
not remedy the lack of explicit instruction in the distinction between holding and dicta. 
 202 Law students tend to “summarize and paraphrase” rather than engage in 
the more difficult work of analyzing. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 30, at 170. 
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Instead, students should be forced to engage in the 
difficult analytical task of expressly identifying both holdings 
and dicta.203 But identification is not sufficient. They should 
also be required to apply the distinction in hypothetical 
situations. This could occur, for example, in an employment 
law course, where students could be required to articulate 
Mackay Radio’s204 holding—and its dicta.205 They could then be 
required to presume Mackay Radio was the only case on the 
topic, and to articulate arguments for and against requiring an 
employer to reinstate a striking employee.206 The students 
would learn to use dicta appropriately and argue its persuasive 
effect.207 Similarly, assignments in legal method courses could 
require students to expressly confront the holding/dicta 
distinction and to draft persuasive arguments for either 
adopting the dicta or for rejecting it.  
Lawyers and judges would also benefit from explicit 
education on the distinction between holding and dicta. Just as 
law students ought to be cautioned against the overreliance on 
words, phrases, and quotations, lawyers and judges could also 
benefit from that reminder.208 For example, a hypothetical 
scenario with a few short cases could be created, and 
participants could discuss which parts of each case are holding 
and which parts are dicta. Continuing legal education seminars 
for the practicing bar could also include debate on how to 
effectively, and ethically,209 use dicta. Judicial seminars could 
cover these topics as well, and address the dangers of drafting 
opinions that mirror those issued by the Supreme Court. And 
perhaps most significant to the bench, special training could be 
  
 203 Requiring students to rethink their research strategies might also be 
fruitful. By using other research tools in tandem with electronic word searching, the 
legal researcher is much more likely to understand case holdings and to be able to 
accurately articulate what a case holds, rather than merely what it states. See supra 
Part III.C.2. 
 204 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 205 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.  
 207 See Lien, supra note 160, at 128-29 (arguing that “in the art of persuasion, 
an effective lawyer must . . . understand and use the contexts in which rules arise to 
bring the audience to the conclusion that fairness and justice dictate that a person in 
the client’s situation must prevail”). Of course, persuasion also includes debating the 
breadth or narrowness of a particular decision, and therefore arguing about what is—
versus what is not—the case’s holding in the first place. 
 208 Law practice is busy. But when lawyers take the time to expressly 
distinguish between a case’s holding and its dictum, they can then argue more 
persuasively about the impact of that case on their client’s situation. 
 209 See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. 
262 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
developed for new law clerks210 to help them distinguish 
between holding and dicta.  
Second, reducing judicial caseloads would make it easier 
for judges and their clerks to spend the time necessary to 
distinguish between holding and dicta—both in the opinions 
they read and in those they write. The current demands on 
judges (and therefore by necessity on their law clerks) limit the 
amount of time that can be spent on any one case.211 Research 
time is especially limited, because the opinion has to be written 
regardless of time pressures.212 If counsel mislabels dicta as 
holding, the court, without adequate time to fully vet counsel’s 
assertion, might rely on that characterization and erroneously 
elevate the dicta to holding. But with adequate time to 
research and analyze the relevant authorities, courts could 
more readily distinguish between dicta and holding.213  
In addition to allowing judges and their clerks to 
distinguish between holding and dicta in the cases cited by 
counsel, decreasing judicial caseloads would also enable judges 
and their clerks to expressly distinguish, in their own opinions, 
holding from dicta. For example, courts could expressly identify 
when they are relying on dicta and explain why they find it 
persuasive. This, in turn, would result in less confusion for 
lawyers and other judges, effectively breaking the cycle created 
by the ripple effect.  
Third, changes to a few key rules—citation rules and 
ethical rules—could help minimize the confusion between 
holding and dicta. For example, citation rules could require a 
parenthetical explanation214 for all case citations indicating 
whether the author’s statement reflects either the particular 
case’s holding or its dicta.215 This requirement would force the 
writer to consciously identify, for every case cited, both the 
holding and the dictum. With this explicit identification, 
readers would have a significant head start in determining for 
  
 210 See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra notes 134, 139-41 and accompanying text.  
 212  See supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 213 Inadequate judicial resources generally result in lower quality opinions. 
See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 51, at 900 n.8, 927-28 (arguing against presumptively 
treating statutory limitations as jurisdictional and pointing out that the resources 
argument cuts both ways because increased jurisdiction has inherent costs as well). 
 214 See, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 173, R. 10.6.1, at 91.  
 215 Although current rules require the writer to indicate when a case is cited 
for its dicta, that rule is rarely followed, in large part because the writer often does not 
bother to consider whether the statement for which the case is being used reflects its 
holding or is dicta. See id. R. 10.6.1(a), at 91; see also supra note 173. 
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themselves whether the proposition is a holding or a dictum, 
and the ripple effect could become a positive phenomenon.  
Similarly, the current citation rule regarding signal 
usage216 could be improved. Specifically, the rule could 
distinguish between case authority and other types of 
authority. For cases, a “see” signal could be required if the 
case’s holding does not directly support the proposition 
asserted by the writer.217 For other authorities—including 
constitutions, statutes, rules, and secondary sources—the 
“statements” made in those authorities are in fact significant,218 
and no signal would be needed when quoting, paraphrasing, or 
summarizing those statements. Only within the realm of case 
law do we confront the dicta problem; for that reason, it makes 
sense to distinguish between cases and other authorities for 
purposes of signals. 
Ethics rules could also be improved and could explicitly 
address the holding/dicta distinction. Current model rules 
require both candor toward the court219 and some level of 
truthfulness when representing clients.220 And both of those 
rules expressly address false statements of law.221 Yet neither 
the model rules nor the comments to those rules address the 
holding/dicta distinction.222 The comments acknowledge that 
advocacy implies some level of creative argumentation.223 But 
  
 216 THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 173, R. 1.2, at 46-48.  
 217 The Bluebook’s focus on scholarly writing makes the signal rule illogical 
when citing case authority. See supra note 174. 
 218 See supra note 174. 
 219 AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) 
(2007) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal . . . .”). Id.  
 220 Id. R. 4.1 (“[A] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person . . . .”). 
 221 Id. R. 3.3, 4.1. 
 222 Rule 3.3(a)(2) requires a lawyer to disclose to the court controlling legal 
authority “known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and 
not disclosed by opposing counsel,” but makes no distinction between holding and dicta. 
Id. 
 223 Rule 3.3 provides: 
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes 
dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a 
disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of 
pertinent legal authorities. . . . The underlying concept is that legal argument 
is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to 
the case. 
Id. R. 3.3 cmt. [4]; see also R. 3.3 cmt. [2] (noting that the special duty of a lawyer as an 
officer of the court is to “avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the 
adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate . . . has an obligation to present 
 
264 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
the rules and comments could be clearer. For example, they 
could explicitly state that when citing a case for other than its 
clear holding, the lawyer is obligated to point out that fact to 
opposing counsel and to the court. 
The proposals briefly introduced here demonstrate the 
breadth of actors with an ability to address the problem: law 
schools, lawyers, judges, bar associations, legislatures, 
Bluebook editors, and the American Bar Association. With the 
concerted effort of even a few of these actors, we can close the 
gap on the confusion that results when dicta is mistaken for 
holding. That, in turn, will help stop the negative ripple effect.  
These tentative proposals are likely not the only 
solutions to this problem, and each has its own limitations. The 
next step is to generate and fully evaluate more concrete 
proposals. But by identifying the likely causes of the confusion 
between holding and dicta, we can begin the debate about how 
to solve the problem. 
  
the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining 
confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the 
tribunal.”). 
